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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SOVEREIGN CDS – BOND RELATION BEFORE AND 
DURING FINANCIAL CRISIS 
  
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
The purpose of the study is to examine the relation of credit default swaps (CDS) and 
the underlying bonds in both emerging market countries and developed market 
countries before and during the financial crisis. I will examine whether there is a 
possible arbitrage opportunities in different markets before and during crisis through the 
basis method. I will also investigate which factors have a significant impact on the basis 
and whether they differ depending on country. I will also investigate the long term and 
short term price discovery process depending on the country. 
 
DATA  
Data set consists of 5 year credit default swap quotes and 5 year generic bond yield 
quotes obtained daily from Datastream or Bloomberg Terminal with the time span of 
2nd of May 2005 to 30th of September 2010. Study includes 21 countries and all in all 
29 673 observations of CDS and bond quotes each.  
 
RESULTS  
Findings of the study show potential arbitrage opportunity through constant positive 
basis in both periods. Basis widens in the time of distress creating even more attractive 
arbitrage opportunity. Basis changes are mainly caused by one or two factors according 
to principal component analysis and partly supported by regression results. Regression 
results show risk appetite to drive the basis changes before crisis. When entering to the 
time of distress economical and political instability reflected through exchange rates and 
liquidity of markets appear to drive the basis changes. Clustering analysis of the basis 
change shows countries to be clustered more according to credit risk of a specific 
country instead of regional factors. 
Lead-lag relationship of derivative markets and bond markets was not stated clearly in 
either period but indicates bond market to be the price discovery location for most of the 
countries before crisis but after the crisis started the price discovery location is strongly 
country depended.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background and motivation for the study 
 
Early stages of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) goes back to the beginning of 1990s when 
Bankers Trust carried out the first trades in 1991. Nevertheless it is JPMorgan which has been 
credited for creating modern CDS in 19941. Originally CDS market was an inter-bank market 
to exchange credit risk without selling the underlying bonds but nowadays it is widely used 
instrument in credit derivative markets (see Figure 1 and 2) and it involves financial 
institutions ranging from insurance companies to hedge funds and banks. 
 
Figure 1. Global OTC derivative market. The figure presents overall market size of OTC derivative 
market from 2004 to 2011. Figure reports notional amounts outstanding in billions of US dollars. Notional 
amounts outstanding provide a measure of market size and reference from which contractual payments are 
determined in derivatives market. 
 
 
Source: BIS 
 
Over the last decade interest towards CDS market has increased and the trading with CDS 
along with it. Financial crisis created a short downturn in the growth which was mainly 
caused by market exits of other players than banks (ECB, 2009). After the low volume years, 
2009 and 2010, the interest towards the market has started to grow again. Quickly growing 
market has captured the interest of researchers and analysts which has led to increased amount 
of studies on CDS and their relation to the underlying bond market. As the majority of trading 
on CDS is still conducted on corporate CDS, previous studies have mainly concentrated on 
                                                          
1
 http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/09/26/the-monster-that-ate-wall-street.html 
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investigating the relationship between corporate bond market and corporate CDS market (cf. 
Hull, Predescu and White, 2004).   
 
Figure 2. Global OTC derivative market. The figure presents overall market size of OTC derivative 
market from 2004 to 2011. Figure reports gross market value in billions of US dollars. Gross market value 
provides a measure of the scale of financial risk transfer taking place in derivatives markets. 
 
 
Source: BIS 
 
Investors have not seen sovereign CDS markets attractive until recent years mainly for two 
reasons. First, the sovereign CDS and bonds spreads have been very low as sovereign bonds 
have been seen as risk-free. Second the trading activity in this segment has been scarce (Arce 
et al., 2012).  Due to these factors the academic interest towards sovereign CDS market has 
been low. In the early stages of sovereign CDS trading, trading was mainly done on emerging 
market CDS as emerging market countries were seen to have higher probability of default 
than developed countries2.  
 
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, investors started to reassess the 
default risk of developed countries which caused widening of spreads as well as increased 
trading on the overall CDS market. The increased default risk was due to financial rescue 
packages and other stabilizing operations in respective countries. This was a necessity as the 
correlation of risk between financial institutions could lead to a system collapse due to an 
individual failure (Bernanke, 2009). These actions have created deteriorated fiscal positions 
leading to increase in the public sector deficit to the levels which have not been seen since 
World War II in developed countries (Panetta et al., 2009). Due to the history of defaults in 
                                                          
2
 Packer and Suthiphongchai (2003) studied the growth of sovereign CDS market and also compared the average 
sovereign CDS premias by credit ratings. As their study found, in the early stages more than 90% of the quotes 
were related to emerging markets.  
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sovereign debt, previous studies conducted on CDS can be put roughly in two categories: 
studies investigating emerging markets before crisis (cf. Küçük, 2010; Levy, 2009) and 
studies investigating developed countries, mainly EU, during crisis (cf. Bai and Collin-
Dufresne 2010, Foley-Fisher 2010).  
 
1.2. Research gap and contribution 
 
Most of the studies have been concentrating on few countries within emerging markets or 
within developed markets.  So far only Wang and Moore (2012) and Longstaff et al. (2010) 
have combined both of the markets in their studies. In this study I will follow more closely 
Longstaff et al. (2008) who included 26 countries ranging from less developed to developed 
countries. The study investigated whether diversifying sovereign credit portfolios across 
countries has benefits by analyzing sovereign credit spreads and excess returns. He conducted 
a regression analysis with global financial market variables, local economic variables, global 
risk premia and net inflows into global funds. Study showed that the excess returns on 
sovereign credit is mostly due to carrying global risk and not country specific risk. Based on 
this they stated that diversifying sovereign credit portfolios internationally might benefit in 
small scale but not as much as diversifying equity portfolios. According to them one reason 
could be the substantially correlated sovereign credit returns compared to correlations of stock 
index returns. However the study did not either cover western countries nor financial crisis 
period. 
 
One approach to study CDS market has been analyzing developed countries before and during 
financial crisis. As one of the example and bases for this study is the study of Fontana and 
Scheicher (2010). They examined CDS and bond spreads of ten Euro area countries from 
2006 to 2010. They divided the time period in two – to time before and after Lehman Brothers 
collapsed. The study analyzed and confirmed the arbitrage opportunity between CDS premia 
and bond yield spreads. They also find ratio of debt to influence on the basis. They also 
examined in which market the price discovery takes place – in CDS market or in bond 
market. They came to the conclusions that it is equally split in the sample group in short term.  
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Inspired by these two studies I am including countries from emerging markets and developed 
markets and using the time period approach introduced by Fontana and Scheicher (2010). I 
will examine whether there is a possible arbitrage opportunities in different countries before 
and during crisis through the basis method. I will also examine which factors have a 
significant impact on the basis and whether they differ depending on country. I will also 
examine the long term and short term price discovery process depending on the country. The 
study can be done due to the fact that I was able to receive data from 21 countries (including 
Europe, Africa, Australia and Asia regions) for the time period of 2005-2010. The behavior of 
CDS-bond market relation through basis method has not been conducted with this 
geographical scope over the financial crisis time. As there has been seen big change especially 
in CDS market behavior during financial crisis, everything is conducted in two periods – 
before crisis and during crisis. This will also give us an opportunity to examine changes the 
financial crisis has caused in different parts of the world. 
 
1.3. Key terms and definitions 
 
Here I will present some key terms used in the study as the definition of the term varies 
among studies.  
 
CDS premia - Premia refers to the price paid of a CDS contract in basis points 
 
CDS spread - In this study spread is referred to the bid-ask spread, even though commonly 
CDS spread has been used as premium paid over a CDS contract. 
 
Basis - Basis is the difference between a CDS and a bond over a risk free bond.  
 
Financial crisis - In this study financial crisis is counted to start from the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers.  
 
Credit event - This refers to events that trigger the payment from the seller to the buyer of the 
contract, for example default or late payments. 
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Bond yield spread - This refers to the yield of a specific bond over a risk-free bond of the 
same maturity. 
 
1.4. Limitation of the study 
 
Limitations are mainly due to the constraints of data. This is caused by fairly young CDS 
market as the active trading with developed countries’ CDS has only started after financial 
turmoil occurred. Due to this my data is starting from May 2005. Insufficient data from 
Datastream restrained my sample period to end in September 2010. Fairly recent trading 
activity resulted in excluding in total of 30 countries from the sample group. 
 
1.5. Structure of the study 
 
The paper is structured as followed. Second chapter will focus on defining the mechanism of 
CDS and how the market works. In third chapter I will closely look at the previous literature. 
In fourth chapter I will form the hypothesis based on the previous studies.  Fifth chapter 
concentrates on describing the methodology more in detail. In chapter six I will describe the 
data used in the study and in chapter seven I will presents the results. Final section concludes 
the paper with summary and presents suggestions for further study. 
2. Credit Default Swap 
 
In this section I will introduce the credit default swap product and its mechanism. I will also 
elaborate more about the market and its participants. I will also shortly compare the CDS 
market and bond market as they have different features although they are expected to trade the 
same default risk. 
 
2.1. Mechanism of a CDS Agreement 
 
A CDS contract allows investor to trade or hedge the risk that an underlying entity would 
default. This can be a corporate, sovereign borrower or financial institution. CDS contract can 
be used for pure trading purposes but many times it is seen as an insurance policy, where one 
11 
 
side assumes the risk and the other pays a premium.  What lowers the threshold to use CDS 
compared to many other securitization is the fact that there is no prefunding required from the 
protection seller’s side.  
 
The protection buyer pays a yearly premia until pre-defined credit event occurs or until the 
contract matures. In case of credit event or if reference borrower becomes insolvent, 
protection seller absorbs the financial losses.  Premia that has been agreed upon, generally 
remains the same until the contract matures. This is also seen as the compensation for 
carrying the risk of a default. If credit event occurs, the protection seller has the obligation to 
settle the contract.  There is two ways of settlements used, cash settlement or physical 
settlement, which will be discussed later on in more detail. Mechanism of the CDS trading 
has been presented in the Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Mechanism of CDS Agreement. This figure presents how the CDS contract is constructed. 
 
 
 
After creation of CDS, sovereign bonds have become assets that can be turn into liquidity if 
needed and short the risk with cheaper and quicker way than one could on bond markets. 
Especially in the current turmoil there is constant news from the markets which indicate 
bigger demand of CDS protection buyers and fewer sellers. This can lead to twisted pricing 
and volatility. When considering the market size (see Figure 4) and the concentration of 
counterparties, one big deal can misrepresent the whole market for one specific country. 
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Chan-Lau and Kim (2004) find that during periods of distress the liquidity moves towards the 
CDS market. This creates a need of working CDS market as the bond market turns expensive 
and illiquid. Fitch’s research3 find the underlying bond yield level and the level of liquidity on 
sovereign CDS to be highly correlated. As the liquidity on sovereign CDS is low, bond yields 
tend to rise and vice-versa.  
 
2.2. Typical Agreement  
 
CDS market has fairly standard agreements with standard maturities however there is demand 
for such and the issue has been addressed by International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA).  Currently one could say a typical CDS contract is written on notional capital of USD 
5 million or USD 10 million with a maturity of 5 or 10 years.  Most of the CDS contracts are 
single name contracts where the credit event depends on one bond or a loan, but portfolio 
name contracts also do exists (e.g. multi-name CDS or Index CDS).  As there is no standard 
agreement, every agreement has to be negotiated separately but they operate under 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association’s Master Agreement frameworks. 
 
2.3. Settlement 
 
The settlement of a CDS contract can be done as a physical settlement or as a cash settlement 
in a case of a credit event.  Typically settlement type has been agreed on up-front.  
Theoretically the incurred loss should be calculated as the difference between the face value 
of the underlying bond and the amount that can be recovered from the underlying issuer. In 
practice it is difficult to predict the post–default recovery value. This has led to the favor of 
physical settlement to overcome the problem.  
 
According to British Banker’s Association Survey (2006), until 2005 physical settlement was 
most commonly used - up to 73% of the cases. This meant that in case of a credit event 
protection buyer has to deliver the underlying bond in exchange for compensation. In cash 
settlement, in case of a credit event protection buyer receives the difference between the bond 
value at the time of a settlement and the bond’s nominal value in cash. Cash Settlement 
                                                            
3
 http://www.fitchratings.com/web/en/dynamic/articles/Greek-Yields-Show-Benefit-of-Liquid-CDS-Market.jsp 
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accounted only for 23 % of cases and only 3 % of contracts were settled by fixed amount. 
Situation after 2005 changed when popularity of cash settlement increased due to the 
incorporation of auction settlement4 procedures in standard CDS contracts (Markit, 2009).  
 
2.4. Market and its participants 
 
The actual size of CDS market is difficult to estimate. This is due to the over-the-counter 
(OTC) nature of the product and data providers which use different sampling and collection 
methods.  There are three main parties Bank for International Settlements (BIS), International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation 
(DTCC) which collect and provide trading and settlement activity data. Estimation of the 
overall size of the market was 32 trillion USD in June 2011 (BIS, 2011). Figure 4 and 5 show 
the development of the market over time both in notional amounts and in gross market value.  
 
Figure 4.Total amount CDS contracts outstanding. The figure presents overall market size of CDS 
market from 2004 to 2011. Figure reports notional amounts outstanding in billions of US dollars. Notional 
amounts outstanding provide a measure of market size and reference from which contractual payments are 
determined in derivatives market. 
 
 
Source: BIS 
 
It is important to note that notional amount reflect the cumulative total of past transactions 
and it can give misleading image of the size of the market. This is due to the large scale 
offsetting transactions as an attempt to increase or decrease the exposure to CDS risk. This 
                                                          
4
 In this procedure participants are asked to submit a bid price as well as a price at which they are willing to trade 
the bond. After this “inside market midpoint” is calculated. Participants are also asked to submit the amount the 
wish to sell or buy. If bid and ask volumes match inside the market midpoint, this will be the final price 
otherwise second round is organized (Helwege et al., 2009) 
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leads to multiple transfer issue which will be addressed later on in more detail. Gross market 
value on the other hand takes into account offsetting transactions, however net notional 
amount of CDS contracts can still exceed the notional amount of bonds. This implies to 
“naked CDS” trading which is more commonly done on corporate CDS. Naked CDS trading 
has caused lot of discussions during last couple of years as it has been accused to increase the 
borrowing costs of the sovereigns5. 
 
Figure 5. Total amount CDS contracts outstanding. The figure presents overall market size of CDS 
market from 2004 to 2011. Figure represents gross market value and is reported in billions of US dollars. Gross 
market value provides a measure of the scale of financial risk transfer taking place in derivatives markets. 
 
 
Source: BIS 
 
From the overall trading in 2011 the majority of the trading in CDS markets was done with 
corporate CDS followed by bank´s CDS and sovereign CDS (see Figure 6).  As the volume of 
sovereign CDS market has been low compared to the bond market (approximately 32 trillion 
USD versus 54 trillion6 USD in June 2011) and due to the OTC nature of the product, only 
big players afford to enter the markets7, which includes banks and other financial 
intermediates (see Figure 7). A survey conducted by Fitch (2009) showed that about 88% of 
the total notional amount bought and sold during the year 2008, were conducted by the 5 
largest members out of the 26 major players on the market. Banks use CDSs mainly for 
managing their own portfolios, but besides banks and security houses, hedge funds are one of 
the biggest participants in the CDS market. 
                                                          
5
 See for example the study of Portes (2010) or Delatte et al. (2012). 
 
6
 http://www.viewsoftheworld.net/?p=1766 
 
7
 Big players have benefited from standardization of contracts in the form of lower transaction costs. This has 
been highly welcomed as bid/ask spreads have narrowed through increased trading. 
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Figure 6. CDS contracts by sector. Figure represents CDS contracts in notional amount outstanding by 
different sectors which are described below more in detail. Figure is reported in billions of US dollars. 
 
 
Sovereigns: Governments excluding publicly owned financial or non-financial firms. 
 
Financial firms: Financial institutions including building societies, leasing companies, insurance companies and 
pension funds.  
 
Non-financial firms: Other than financial firms and sovereigns.  
 
Securitized products, i.e. portfolio or structured products: CDS contracts written on a securitized product or 
a combination of securitized products, i.e. asset-backed securities (ABS) or mortgage-backed securities (MBS). 
The reference entity of these types of contracts are the individual securities or loans that were used to construct 
it. These contracts could be therefore classified as multi-name rather than single-name instruments.  
 
CDS on other securitised products (including collateralised debt obligations)  
 
Multisectors: CDS where the reference entities belong to different sectors (such as in the case of basket credit 
default swaps).  
 
Source: BIS 
 
Most of the trading up to the market crash in 2008 was done on emerging market papers as 
Western countries were seen as risk-free.  Also as ISDA started to provide standardized 
definitions on terms and conditions of the CDS8, it increased the popularity of CDS contracts. 
At the same time though the data from ECB (2009) shows large scale exits of other’s than 
bank players from CDS markets after the crisis started.  This applies to all CDS categories, 
not just sovereign CDS market.  
  
                                                          
8
 Last amendments to the Master agreement have been introduced in 2009, when the auction settlement has been 
defined more in detail (www.isda.org) 
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Figure 7. CDS contracts by counterparty. Figure represents counterparties share of the overall CDS 
market in percentages between 2004 and 2011. Categories are defined below. 
 
Reporting dealers: Institutions whose head office is located in one of the 13 reporting countries (Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States) and which participate in the semiannual OTC derivatives market statistics. 
“Reporting dealers” are mainly commercial and investment banks and securities houses, including their branches 
and subsidiaries and other entities that are active dealers.  
Financial institutions: Financial institutions which are not reporting dealers, including central counterparties 
(CCPs), banks, funds and non-bank financial institutions which may be considered as financial end users (eg 
mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, currency funds, money market funds, building societies, leasing 
companies, insurance companies and central banks).  
 
Non-financial customer: Any counterparty other than those described above, in practice mainly corporate firms 
and governments. 
 
Source: BIS 
 
2.5. Credit events 
 
History shows that defaults usually come in waves and concentrates on time of distress such 
as Great Depression and World War 2 (Moody’s, 2009). History also shows that emerging 
markets are more likely to default than developed markets (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008).  
 
In general credit event can be triggered by the crash of an entity, problems of payments 
(premias), restructuring of debt, obligation default and obligation acceleration (ISDA, 2002). 
Full-scale defaults usually do not apply to sovereign CDS which leads the contract 
documentation to concentrate on debt restructuring, repudiation/moratorium and failure to 
pay.  This means for example late payments can trigger a CDS. 
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2.6. Reasons for a government default 
 
Looking at the history, governments have usually defaulted due to debt in foreign currency 
(Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza, 2007). This has led to renegotiation of debt exchange and 
restructuring.  According to Hatchondo et al. (2007) this will mean drop in GDP and decrease 
in growth staying between 0,5 - 2%. This will be followed by a drop in the rating of the 
country, growing debt expenses, slower pace of trading, stress on banking system and 
appearance of political changes.   
 
Home currency defaults may occur for couple of reasons. In some countries there is a rule of 
having to have gold as a guarantee for the printed money and government runs out of gold. 
Second problem is the shared currency. For example now Greece cannot print more money as 
it uses euro. Also printing money will devaluate the currency and increase inflation 
exponentially which again shrinks “real economy”. For companies which have used foreign 
currency debt to acquire assets in home currency, devaluation would be disastrous. Due to this 
some countries rather default in their own currency than devaluate.    
 
2.7. CDS market versus Bond market 
 
Few considerations should be taken into account when comparing the markets and products. 
As mentioned one of the biggest advantages of CDS is the unfunded nature of the product. 
The off balance-sheet nature of CDS contracts attract investors who would like to “clear up” 
their balance-sheet. For them it is more attempting to sell a protection than to buy a bond to 
receive the exposure to the same credit risk. This leads to the situation of having partly 
different market participants in bond markets and in CDS markets which also trade for 
different reason (Blanco et al., 2003). This is actually recommendable as it reduces the 
counterparty risk which is seen as one of the most notable risks in CDS market9. The problem 
is not eased by multiple transfer of credit risk where protection seller hedges the exposure 
with another party which again hedges it forward. This problem has been addressed by 
suggesting trade compression parties as well as central counterparty.  
                                                            
9
  For example see study by Arce et al. (2011)  or Levy (2009) 
 
18 
 
 
Besides the suggested central clearing, CDS contracts generally oblige protection seller to 
post collateral. According to ISDA standards, these collaterals are risk sensitive and the 
amount of collateral moves as the underlying entity’s default risk moves. This has been done 
to prevent systematic risk due to multiple transfer of credit risk. 
    
CDS is not either linked to a specific bond but to a specific issuer. In case of a credit event 
combined with a physical settlement option, the protection buyer can choose from a pool of 
bonds which he can deliver and profit from the cheapest-to-deliver option10.  The method is 
described more in detail in section 5.1. 
 
Bond market tends to gather investors with the buy-and-hold strategy such as insurance 
companies and pension funds. Due to the strategy, it results in poor liquidity in the market 
whereas CDS market does not hold this problem. The amount of CDS contracts is also not 
fixed which has the counter effect of multiple transfer of credit risk. 
 
One aspect is also that in case of a credit event according to CDS agreement, seller pays the 
par minus the recovery rate, while in bond agreement the bond holder may only get market 
price minus the recovery rate. 
 
Besides the reasons above, according to Fontana and Scheicher (2010) from trader’s point of 
view bonds and CDS are not perfect substitutes. Bond prices are seen to be affected by 
interest rate risk, default risk, funding risk and market risk. CDS prices on the other hand are 
only affected by default risk and counterparty risk. 
3. Literature review 
  
In this section I will present the previous studies on which I will base my hypothesis and 
analysis on later on. Corporate CDS market has been the main target of studies and it will be 
briefly introduced while the main focus will be on studies conducted on sovereign CDS 
markets and their relation to the underlying bond market. 
                                                            
10
  This has been studied by Ammer and Cai (2011) 
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3.1. Overall view on CDS market 
 
Growing size of CDS market has created interest towards studying CDS and its relation to 
bonds and other variables. As the corporate CDS market is still three times bigger than the 
sovereign CDS market (see Figure 6), studies have concentrated mainly on corporate markets. 
Studies have approached the topic from many perspectives covering for example, 
determinants of the corporate bond spread (cf. Chen et al. 2007), the relation of determinants 
and corporate CDS premias (cf. Longstaff et al., 2005; Ericsson et al., 2009) or corporate 
CDS price discovery place (cf. Zhu, 2006). Longstaff et al. (2005) find for example liquidity 
to have an impact on CDS premias while Ericsson et al. (2009) find firm’s leverage and 
volatility to have an impact. Price discovery studies suggests corporate CDS market to reflect 
the information more accurately and quicker that the bond market before the crisis11. Study 
conducted by Zhu (2006) also showed that even though long-run parity conditions hold, in 
short-run price discrepancies can exist between corporate CDS and bond market.  
 
The sovereign bond market differs from corporate bond world as they traditionally have very 
low probability of default12.  Sovereign bonds have been seen as a “safe-haven” in financial 
turbulence (Hartmann et al., 2004) and they are among the largest borrowers in the world. 
Sovereign bonds have also more bonds outstanding, longer maturities and larger issues 
compared to corporate bonds (Ammer and Cai, 2011). Sovereigns do not have the options of 
loans as companies nor do they go bankrupt or liquidate their assets in financial distress. 
 
Although sovereigns lack the option of complete bankruptcy, the recent financial turmoil has 
created some doubts about using sovereign bonds as a risk free rate – which is also the key 
feature of asset pricing. The doubt cast on the stability of the governments is due to financial 
aid governments have given to their financial institutions since October 2008 (Ejsing and 
Lemke, 2010). The doubt is not without a reason according to studies. Dieckmann and Plank 
(2010) studied the pricing of sovereign CDS with a focus on the private-public risk transfer in 
16 European countries from 2003 to 2009. They found sovereign CDS to be significantly 
linked to the respective country’s banking system. They also find EMU countries CDS 
                                                            
11
 See for example Blanco et al. (2005) or Hilscher et al. (2011) 
 
12
 See for example studies on sovereign bond market liquidity or market integration (cf. Manganelli and 
Wolswijk, 2009) or bond market developments in euro area during crisis time (cf. Sgherri and Zoli, 2009; Haugh 
et al., 2009). 
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premias’ to be more sensitive to the stability of the financial institutions than non-EMU 
countries. This question was also analyzed by Ejsing and Lemke (2010) who also documented 
a linkage between CDS premia changes of Euro area banks and their governments. They find 
financial aid packages to lower banks’ CDS premia but at the same time increase sovereign 
CDS premia. Dataset consisted of 10 countries and 25 banks. Time period is from January 
2008 to June 2009. An alternative approach has been presented by Pan and Singleton (2008) 
and Andritzky and Singh (2007) where they consider separately default risk and recovery risk 
which is one of the key elements when pricing CDS.  
 
Merton (1974) introduced the structural model which is commonly used as the theoretical 
framework for analyzing corporate credit risk. Gapen et al. (2005) extended the model to 
cover sovereign credit risk. They argued that the main drivers of the risk are the volatility of 
the sovereign assets and the country’s leverage. Due to this Gapen et al. (2005) see corporate 
and sovereign credit risk analysis to be comparable.  
 
3.2. Possibility for arbitrage and reasons for it 
 
So called basis method has been widely adopted method to investigate the arbitrage 
opportunities between CDS and bond markets and to determine theoretical prices. This has 
been created due to the difficulty of determining repo costs and counterparty risk. In basis 
method the possibility for arbitrage arises when the difference between CDS premia and bond 
spreads does not equal to zero.  
 
When markets are rational and investors share the same information, the difference the bond 
and the CDS premia should equal to zero as they are supposed to be the prices for the same 
credit risk. However when examining CDS-bond parity Levy (2009) was not able to find zero 
basis to hold for emerging market countries although when liquidity effects are counted in he 
is able to confirm the theoretical assumptions of the zero basis. Küçük (2010) studies CDS-
bond basis for 21 emerging market countries before financial crisis and comes to the same 
conclusion. He finds that basis does not equal to zero and it is related to bond liquidity, 
speculation in CDS market, CDS liquidity, equity market performance and world 
macroeconomic factors. Ammer and Cai (2011) study shows that “cheapest to deliver” option 
is one factor affecting CDS premia, driving the basis above zero when studying nine 
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emerging market countries. They also find that CDS premia and bond spread are linked by a 
stable linear long-rum equilibrium relations. Foley-Fischer (2010) again studied relation of 
bond and CDS premia of ten EMU countries. He finds that in non-crisis time the basis is 
consistent with relatively small amount of investors believing that one of the European 
countries would default and thus create no arbitrage opportunities. However he finds evidence 
that during the time of distress apparent arbitrage opportunities emerges. Foley-Fischer’s data 
was from the years 2008 and 2009. Palladini and Portes (2011) studied 6 euro countries from 
2004 to 2011 and concluded that the basis does not equal to zero giving the opportunity for 
arbitrage. However they did not differentiate between pre crisis and post crisis time. Arce et 
al. (2012) was able to include counterparty variable in the study and find counterparty risk 
indicator to have a negative and significant impact on the basis. They also find costs and low 
liquidity in the bond market compared to CDS market to have a negative impact on the basis. 
This finding is in line with the previous studies. 
 
Instead of using basis method, Mayordomo, Pena and Romo (2011a) did an analysis of 
persistent deviation between CDS and bond market with European corporate bonds to study 
arbitrage opportunities. Their result show persistent deviation both in pre-crisis and during 
crisis period.  
 
Fontana and Scheicher (2010) find sovereign basis to be positive before and during crisis. 
They argue that it might be due to “flight to liquidity” effect (Beber et al., 2009). This 
phenomenon result in lower bond spreads during the time of distress. They also find basis to 
be significantly linked to the cost of short-selling bonds and both country specific and global 
risk factors. Longstaff et al (2010) was able to find evidence that CDS premias are more 
related to global factors than local factors when studying 26 developed and less-developed 
countries. The study stated that more than 50% of sovereign CDS premias were explained by 
three components. All of these components are global variables. They also find that CDS 
quotes of sample countries were highly correlated. Longstaff et al. (2010) also concluded that 
from the global variables, variables related to US market changes had the most impact on the 
CDS premias. Global factors importance for CDS premias was also documented by Pan and 
Singleton (2007) when they examined sovereign CDS premias against U.S. stock market 
returns and VIX volatility index.  Remolona et al. (2007) found that country specific 
fundamentals primarily drives sovereign risk while global investors’ risk aversion drives time 
variation in the risk premia when using a dynamic panel data model. 
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3.3. Relationship of CDS and Bond Spreads 
 
Most of the papers on price discovery between CDS and bond markets are based on either 
Hasbrouck’s (1995) or Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) methodologies. These methods 
investigate the short-term relationship of the markets. For investigating the long term 
relationship almost all of the studies relay on Johansen cointegration method (1991).  
 
Studies conducted before crisis show that it is difficult to conclude that one particular market 
dominates the price discovery process in short-term (cf. Chan-Lau and Kim, 2004) or that 
price discovery appears to be country depended (cf. Bowe, Klimaviciene and Taylor, 2009). 
Ammer and Cai (2011) find difficult to determine which market leads in the study of 9 
emerging market countries before crisis, but they argue that relatively more liquid market 
tends to lead. Longstaff et al. (2010) and Arce et al. (2012) in their studies find price 
discovery process to be state-depended. As Ammer and Cai, Arce et al. argue market liquidity 
to be a significant factor in determining which market leads price discovery. Delatte et al. 
(2010) studies 11 European countries from 2008 to 2010 and find that bond market tend to 
lead the price discovery process during low tension periods, but during high tension periods 
CDS market leads. This finding goes hand in hand with the study of Fontana and Scheicher 
(2010) and  is supported by study conducted by Delis and Mylonidis (2010). Delis and 
Mylonidis studied four South European Euro currency country from 2007 to 2010. They 
examined the dynamic interrelation between bond and CDS premias on the basis based on 
Granger causality test. Palladini and Portes (2011) study of 6 euro area countries find 
derivative markets to move ahead of bond markets. Though they did not separate the time 
period pre and post crisis.  
4. Hypothesis 
 
In this section I will build my hypothesis based on the previous studies. 
 
The two main factors of which the basis is constructed from includes bond yield and CDS 
premia, besides the risk-free bond yield. Those two factors are assumed to price the same risk 
– default risk of a specific country. This should result in the basis to equal zero in the long run 
due to theoretical assumption of investors to be rational and share the same information. 
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However as there are different participants in the CDS market and bond market due to the 
difference in the nature of the products, they also trade for different reasons (Blanco et al., 
2003). Different motives of trading could also lead into following and gathering different 
information. This might cause the bond yield and CDS premia to move independently 
resulting in basis being either positive or negative which is widely documented phenomenon 
by previous studies. Due to this and based on the results of the previous study (cf. Levy, 2009; 
Palladini et al., 2011) I construct my first hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Overtime basis does not always equal to zero, therefore there is a 
possibility for arbitrage. 
 
There is a general assumption of CDS premias to be higher in emerging market13 countries 
than in developed market countries. This is based on the assumption of emerging market 
countries to have higher default risk than developed countries (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). 
The differences rise from economical, political, social and demographical issues which differ 
between these groups. Due to the close nature of CDS premia and basis I will extend this 
assumption to effect the basis as well and construct my second hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The basis is higher in emerging markets than in the developed markets 
over time. 
 
The difference between the CDS premia of emerging market countries and developed market  
countries has been generally recognized but the geographical co-movement of the CDS 
premia has been studied less. Due to this I will next examine whether the basis move in 
geographically clustered groups or whether it tends to create groups based to the prevailed 
default risk resulting in economically clustered groups. In Longstaff et al. study, in the 
Working Paper version published in April 2008, they had included cluster analysis which 
showed CDS premias’ co-movement to be clustered according to geographical areas such as 
Middle East countries as one cluster and Asian countries in another cluster. It would refer the 
basis to move according to other factors than credit spread levels. Based on this I will 
construct my third hypothesis.  
                                                            
13
 In this study emerging market is defined to include countries of the MSCI Emerging Markets Index: Brazil, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. 
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Hypothesis 3 (H3): The basis move in clusters according to geographical regions, 
Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia. 
 
Next I will examine the determinants which possibly cause the basis to change and might also 
explain the geographical co-movement differences. Previous studies have mainly focused on 
examining variables’ impact on CDS premia instead of the basis, however I will use these 
studies as comparable due to close nature of CDS premia and the basis.  Previous studies (cf. 
Longstaff et al., 2010; Pan and Singleton, 2007) have concluded global variables to have 
significance impact on the premia. Most of these variables have been US related. This has 
been documented for example by Longstaff et al. (2010), who find CDS premias to be 74% 
correlated with US Stock Market returns through principal component analyses. Also Wang 
and Moore (2012) find particularly developed countries to be linked tighter to the US and US 
interest rate since the Lehman Brothers collapsed. Wang and Moore studied the sovereign 
CDS spreads of 38 emerging and developed economies from January 2007 to December 
2009.  
As important as US economic changes have been on CDS premia, market liquidity has been 
documented to be one of the key driver for premia changes as well (cf. Kücük, 2010). 
Liquidity’s impact has not been widely studied yet, but studies which have included the 
variable, have shown it to have significant impact. Liquidity of a market is argued by many 
studies to determine where the price discovery takes place also therefore an interesting 
variable to study. Based on this I will test and construct my fourth and fifth hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): US Stock return and US Treasury yield have a significant impact on 
the basis in majority of the countries. 
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Liquidity variable has a significant impact on the basis in majority of 
the countries. 
 
My last hypothesis will examine where the price discovery will take place – within the bond 
market or CDS market. Previously conducted cluster analysis and regression results might 
also help to explain the price discovery behavior. According to Fontana and Scheicher, 2010, 
price discovery is taken place in markets where informed investors trade the most. Before the 
financial crisis started, sovereign bonds were seen as safe haven which lead to low volume of 
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trading on the developed market CDS. Based on Fontana and Scheicher’s statement and 
supported by other studies (cf. Delis and Mylodinis, 2010) it can be expected that the price 
discovery should have taken place in the bond markets before the crisis. When financial 
turmoil started, investors’ views changed. Investors saw a growing possibility of sovereign 
default as governments started to provide rescue packages for their banks to overcome the 
related problems which Lehman Brothers’ collapse created (cf. Dieckmann and Plank, 2010). 
As the probability of default grew, investors started to look for an option to hedge their risk 
and turned to CDS market. The shift from bond market to derivative market has been also 
documented by Delatte et al. (2010) among others.  Based on these findings I will construct 
my sixth and seventh hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Price discovery takes place in the bond market before the financial 
crisis. 
 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Price discovery takes place in the CDS market during the financial 
crisis. 
5. Methodology 
 
In this section I will introduce the methodology used in the thesis and rationalize the choice of 
the methodology. Main focus is to analyze the basis which will be introduced more closely in 
the section followed. I will also use different methodologies to study both long term and short 
term relationship between CDS and bond market – whether there is a cointegration and 
whether one market leads the other in the short term.   
 
5.1. Arbitrage opportunity and the Basis 
 
Sovereign CDS and government bonds are assumed to offer investors exposure to the same 
risk or return of the sovereign debt.  This means CDS premia and bond yield spreads should 
be equal and react the same way and at the same time to the market events or otherwise there 
is an opportunity for arbitrage.  However this is not always the case. According to Duffie 
(1999) and elaborated by Hull and White (2003), there exists a perfect arbitrage opportunity. 
This is created between a risky bond at par, a riskless par bond and a CDS contract of the 
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same maturity. They base their view on the assumptions that the price of a CDS contract can 
always be deducted from an asset swap spread of a bond. However this requires frictionless 
repo markets and that the recovery rate of a defaulted bond to be zero. This also requires an 
estimate of risk-neutral probability that the underlying bond defaults at different future times 
and that there exists a recovery rate. 
 
If following Duffie’s and Hull and White’s logic, without taking into account costs associated 
with shorting a risky asset, annual yield of risk-free bond must equal to the difference 
between annual yield of the risky bond and the cost of credit protection expressed as a 
percentage of the risky bond nominal value. 
 
Let’s assume CDS premia represents the annual premia paid at CDS market for the credit 
protection. The annual yield of risk free bond is represented by BY rf and annual yield of risky 
bond by BY, then: 
 
BY rf  = BY – CDS premia   ( 1 ) 
 
 
This will mean every time BY rf  > BY - CDS premia investors make profit buying the risk-free 
bond, shorting risky bond and selling protection.  On the other hand when BY rf  < BY - CDS 
premia then buying the risky bond, buying protection to it and shorting the risk-free bond would 
be profitable.  
 
The same can be presented in terms of the basis. The basis is the difference between CDS 
premia and the bond yield of the same underlying entity minus risk-free bond yield of the 
same maturity. 
 
For no arbitrage to appear, basis should equal to zero: 
 
“Basis” = CDS premia – (BY – BY rf ) = 0  ( 2 ) 
 
For this theoretical arbitrage relation to hold, each feature of the two bonds must be identical. 
We must also disregard the counterparty risk, i.e., the possibility that the protection seller 
might be unable to make payment in case of a credit event. 
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In case basis does not equal to zero we face a situation more commonly known as positive 
basis or negative basis. When CDS premia is greater than bonds spread we have positive basis 
situation. This means investor can sell the CDS , buy a risk-free bond and short sell the 
reference entity bond to gain arbitrage profit.  When the CDS premia is smaller than bond 
spread we have so called negative basis. In this case investor should buy CDS contract, 
reference entity bond and short sell the risk free bond.   
 
 
 
As found in literature review in practice basis does not equal to zero and can be negative or 
positive. Andritzky and Singh (2007) and Merrill Lynch (2006) among others provide a 
sample of the factors that can cause the phenomenon: 
 
Structural factors  
 
1. Cheapest-to-deliver option can drive CDS premia wider. After credit event protection 
buyer has to deliver qualifying loan or a bond to the risk seller as for payment (in case of 
physical settlement). Buyer has the incentive to deliver the least valuable instrument that 
is eligible. As market simultaneously looks for cheapest-to-deliver option this might cause 
a “squeeze” on these bonds and drive prices up elsewhere.  
 
2. As CDS are unfunded it attends to pull CDS spreads tighter. When investors which are 
funded above LIBOR sell a protection and at the same time has the CDS premia locked at 
LIBOR rates, this creates an attractive opportunity for investor. This again drives CDS 
basis tighter.  
 
CDS spread > Bond Spread 
”positive basis” 
CDS spread < Bond Spread 
”negative basis” 
1. Sell CDS 
2. Buy risk-free bond 
3. Short sell the 
reference entity bond 
1. Buy CDS 
2. Buy the reference 
entity bond 
3. Short sell risk-free 
bond 
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3. Counterparty risk tends to tighten the basis as well. Whether the payment is received in 
case of default depends on the counterparty, not the underlying entity. The risk depends 
on the degree of correlation of default risk between underlying entity and the 
counterparty.  The higher the correlation, the greater the risk for the protection buyer. This 
factor will be also tested in this study. 
 
4. Some bonds have a feature of coupon step-up language. If rating of the issuer is 
downgraded the coupon increases and vice versa. However CDS premia does not follow 
the rule. As an example when rating trend is negative it will have a widening impact on 
basis. 
 
5. Trading below or above par can also effect on the basis. As an example, if the bond is 
traded below par, the buyer carries only the risk of the cash price of the bond, while the 
protection seller carries the risk of the par value.  This leads to protection seller to demand 
higher premium and drive the basis wider.  
 
6. Haas (2003) also suggest that a technical default14 can cause widening of CDS spreads. In 
this case all the characteristics of credit event exist but no official credit event has been 
confirmed.  Protection seller can require higher CDS premiums as a compensation for the 
scenario.  
 
Market factors 
 
1. Illiquidity of underlying debt can have an impact on the basis. The effect is uncertain as 
there might be two options for the illiquidity. In one case protection can be more liquid 
than the underlying bond and as many want to cover their exposure it tightens the CDS 
spread. The other option can be that debt itself is popular and is traded very tight causing 
CDS premia to widen. 
 
2. Issuance of large synthetic CDOs tend to pull the overall CDS market tighter. This is due 
to originating banks which have to build up long credit positions in wide range of names 
before or after the transactions. 
                                                            
14
  Technical default is defined as violation against bond covenant requirements by the issuer. These defaults do 
not refer to failure to pay interest and do not necessarily result in losses to the bondholder (Haas, 2003). 
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3. Investors view on credit market can drive the basis wider. This is due to the fact that 
investor can take either long credit position or a short credit position. When the market is 
viewed negatively investors tend to buy protections as it is seen easier than borrowing 
bonds for short selling. This leads to investors possibly paying more for protection than 
what the bid side is on assets swaps. 
 
4. Investor also holds repo market option which can lead to higher CDS premiums. This is 
due to the option of the protection buyer to refinance in the cash market with a repo 
agreement under the risk free rate.  
 
Besides the market and structure risks mentioned above there can be other factors influencing 
on arbitrage opportunities. One can be the must have opportunity to borrow or sell risk-free 
and another can be tax issues. Arbitrage theory also assumes that you can sell the bond with 
face value plus accrued interest even though in reality the bonds are sold only as face value 
(Zhu, 2004). 
 
I will be using the basis method to study my first hypothesis and support second hypothesis 
with it:  
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Overtime basis does not always equal to zero, therefore there is 
possibility for arbitrage. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The basis is higher in emerging markets than in the developed markets 
over time. 
 
 
5.2. Principal component analysis 
 
With principal component analysis I am trying to isolate a small number of common factors 
that would explain the correlation pattern. This is done for CDS premiums, bond yield spreads 
and for the basis.   
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This method has been used by Longstaff et al. (2010) and Pan and Singleton (2006) among 
others in their studies. Both of the studies find first principal component to have strong 
expletory power of the movements. I will us principal component analysis to examine if there 
is as strong co-movement in my sample. This would refer to few factors having big influence 
on the spread changes over the whole sample group. Later on I will attempt to capture these 
components through regression method.  
 
Principal component analysis is also conducted on 14 banks’ CDS premias for the period 
from May 2005 to September 2010. This is done to obtain the first component which will be 
later on used in regression to describe the default probability of the counterparties. 
 
5.3. Clustering analysis 
 
Principal component analysis supports the cluster analysis. As principal component analysis 
looks for common factors, cluster analysis helps to identify the structure of it through 
searching structure in correlation matrix – which countries move alike.  
 
Cluster analysis is used to classify a set of items into two or more mutually exclusive 
unknown groups based on combination of interval variables. In other words, algorithm tries to 
form groups of data so that the average correlation between countries of the same group is 
maximized while the average correlation between countries of different groups is minimized. 
As Longstaff et al, (2008) I will use Ward’s method in which clusters are formed so as to 
minimize the increase in the within-cluster sum of squares. The distance between two clusters 
is the increase in these sums of squares if the two clusters were merged. Cluster analysis 
stopping rules are used to determine the number of clusters in the data. 
 
Cluster analysis will be conducted on the basis spread to examine which countries tend to 
move together. This helps me to study the hypothesis number two and three. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The basis move in clusters according to geographical regions, 
Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia. 
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5.4. Multiple regression 
 
As principal component analysis looked for the commonalities and cluster analysis the 
structures of the commonalities, multiple regression will try to analyze the nature of them. I 
will try to catch the reason for the commonalities through hypothesis based on previous 
studies. I will use multiple regression method to test my fourth and fifth hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): US Stock return and US Treasury yield have a significant impact on 
the basis in majority of the countries. 
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Liquidity variable has a significant impact on the basis in majority of 
the countries. 
 
Multiple regression method minimizes the sum of squared vertical distances between the 
observed responses in the dataset and the responses predicted by the linear. By using multiple 
regression method I am trying to assess which factors have an impact on the changes of the 
basis. To do this I have chosen a set of variables which has been found significant in the 
previous studies (cf. Arce et al., 2012; Fontana and Scheicher, 2010). The distinction between 
global, local and risk premium variables was introduced by Longstaff et al. (2010) and it is 
partly reproduced in this paper. 
 
My empirical model is constructed as followed. 
 
∆ Basisit = c + β1 ∆ (Debt to GDP) t + β2 ∆ (Exchange rate) t + β3 ∆ (US Treasury Yield) t + 
β4 ∆ (US Stock Market) t + β5 ∆ (European Stock Market) t + β6 ∆ (iTraxx) t + β7 ∆ (VIX) t + 
β8 ∆ (Counterparty) t  + β9  ∆ (Bid-Ask Spread) t  + ɛit                                                                        ( 3 ) 
  
 
Where Basisit represents the difference between CDS premia and corresponding bond yield 
over risk-free rate of a country i at the time t.  β represents the change of the specific variable 
and ɛ is the error term. 
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I will also use Newey-West correction to overcome the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
in the error terms in the model. This is often used to correct the effect of correlation in the 
error terms regression applied to time series. 
 
5.4.1 Variables used in regression 
 
In this section I will present more closely variables used in regression. Variables are mainly 
chosen based on previous studies where these variables have shown to be significant. I will 
also introduce few a new variables or an alternative variable for the previous studies. 
5.4.1.1 Local variables 
 
This group of variables is designed to measure the impact of the local economy on the basis. 
Local variables are assumed to have an effect on the basis to show the country itself can effect 
on their own probability of default.  
5.4.1.1.1 Proxy for a country’s debt 
 
Following Fontana and Scheicher’s study (2010), first local variable is the proxy of country’s 
total outstanding bonds relative to its GDP. In the structural models of sovereign credit risk 
(Gapen et al., 2005) higher debt relative to assets is a major risk factor. Following this 
assumption I am expecting to see high debt increasing the volatility of the CDS premia and 
this way also higher CDS premias. Large bond market generally lower transaction costs 
through high liquidity of the market. However if demand is lower than the amount pushed to 
market, it might have adverse impact on bond market liquidity.  
 
5.4.1.1.2 Exchange rate 
 
The exchange rate measures the strength of the local economy relative to its international 
counterparties. Volatility in currency can be caused by economic and political instability 
which worsens the credit quality and leads to depreciation of the currency. I am using 
exchange rate as a proxy for capturing the effects of capital flows of goods and the effects of 
local political and economic events on the credit qualities of sovereign issuers (Pan and 
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Singleton, 2006). The exchange rate is expressed as the amount of local currency that can be 
bought for one US dollar.  
 
5.4.1.2 Global variables 
 
As US is not included in the sample we are mainly using US related variables to measure 
global factors impact on the basis. This approach is in line with the study of Longstaff et al. 
(2010) who finds US Federal Reserve decisions and US economic situation to have a big 
impact on global scope. 
 
5.4.1.2.1 US Treasury yield 
 
US Treasury yield reflects the risk free asset as well as potential changes in US economic 
growth.  This variable has been used for example in Longstaff et al. (2010) study.  
 
5.4.1.2.2 US stock market return 
 
This variable is used to capture the effects of the US business cycle. We have used MSCI US 
Broad Market index as it represents 99,5% of the capitalization in the US equity market.  
 
5.4.1.2.3 European stock market return   
 
I will present this variable, MSCI Europe, to capture the business cycle in Europe. This is 
done to capture the financial crisis implications in Europe. MSCI Europe consists of 16 
developed market country indices: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom. 
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5.4.1.3 Risk Premium variables 
 
These variables are designed to measure the impact of the investors risk appetite as well as 
systematic risk through counterparty variable. All variables measure different kind of risk.  
5.4.1.3.1 VIX 
 
The index of implied volatility of S&P 500 index and it is widely used measure of risk. 
Variable shows market’s expectation of future volatility. Additionally it provides information 
on the amounts the investors are willing to pay to protect their positions from price volatility. 
Following the study of Longstaff et al. (2010), which find variable to have high correlation 
with CDS premia changes, I am including this variable. 
 
5.4.1.3.2 Corporate CDS premium (iTraxx Europe)  
 
This index is added to catch the investors overall appetite for credit risk. iTraxx Europe 
consists equally weighted, 125 most liquid corporate CDS names of the Europe.   
 
5.4.1.3.3 Counterparty risk   
 
As mentioned before counterparty risk plays a big role in highly concentrated CDS market. 
Due to the nature of the CDS market I cannot identify the exact counterparties for each CDS 
contract. This would be difficult even though I would know the original counterparty 
information as the process of `netting' in the credit market makes it extremely hard. This is 
due to for example multiple credit risk transfer. Therefore I am implementing method used by 
Arce et al. (2012) in their study. I will use the first principal component obtained from the 
CDS premiums of the main 14 banks which act as dealers on the market15. The first principal 
component series should reflect the common default probability and there for work as 
                                                            
15
 Main dealers are: Bank of America, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, 
Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Royal Bank of Scotland, Societe Generale, UBS and Wells 
Fargo (ISDA Research notes, 2010) 
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measure of counterparty risk16. The first principal component of the banks’ CDS premias 
manages to explain 98% of the total variance of the observed variables in the first period. In 
the second period the first principal component explains 63% of the total variance of the 
observed variables.  
 
5.4.1.4 Liquidity Variables 
 
5.4.1.4.1 Bid-ask spread 
 
As noted many studies find liquidity to have a big impact on spreads (cf. Levy, 2009). To test 
for the relative liquidity effects I will count the difference of bid and ask prices of CDS in 
each country. Bigger the CDS spread, less liquid is the market. 
 
Unfortunately due to data availability problems I was able to gather only CDS data which 
causes the variable to tell only liquidity situation on CDS markets.  
 
For countries Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Sweden and 
Turkey, I was not able to obtain the bid and/or ask prices. Thus, I constructed a general bid 
and ask spread based on all available bid-ask data. 
 
5.4.2.  Excluded variables  
 
I have not included sovereign ratings as to explain variations in CDS premia as Cossin and 
Hricko (2001) and as Cossin and Jung (2005). Since rating has an impact on bond prices, one 
can intuitively expect that higher rating would lead to lower CDS premias and vice-versa. 
This approach is more long-term oriented since the ratings are not adjusted fast enough after 
the arrival of the information to the market. There for I have excluded this variable.  
 
Remolona et al. (2007) used other macroeconomic variables such as inflation rate, industrial 
production, CDP growth consensus forecast and foreign exchange reserve. Their results show 
                                                            
16
 Arora et al. (2009) used dealers’ CDS spreads as a proxy for counterparty risk in their study. They study the 
existence of counterparty risk in the corporate CDS market. 
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some of the factors to be significant but they have been excluded from the study based on 
insufficient data. 
 
5.5. Price discovery analysis 
 
An efficient price discovery process is result of quick adjustment of the prices to the new 
information according to Yan and Zivot (2007). Previous studies have looked at the CDS and 
bond relation from long term and short term perspective. For the long-term relation most of 
the studies have relayed on Johansen’s cointegration method (1995) which is also the 
foundation for short-term testing with Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). With these 
methods I will test my fourth and fifth hypothesis of 
 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Price discovery takes place in the bond market before the financial 
crisis. 
 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Price discovery takes place in the CDS market during the financial 
crisis. 
 
5.5.1.  Unit-root and cointegration 
 
For being able to use VECM model, CDS and bond yield spreads have to be tested for non-
stationary and cointegration. To test non-stationary feature, I will perform the standard 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) on both CDS and bond 
yield spreads. The model is constructed as followed. 
 
 ∆ = 	 + 	
 +  + 
∆	
 + ∆	 +⋯+ ∆	 +    ( 4 ) 
 
where  is a constant,  the coefficient on a time trend and k the lag order of the 
autoregressive process. 
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For testing long term relationship through cointegration I will perform Johansen’s Test for 
cointegration.  As I have only two variables, result can show at most rank one cointegration 
relationship. Johansen’s model is contracted as followed. 
 
  ∆	 = 	
	
 +∑ Г∆		
 + 
	


    ( 5 ) 
 
If two price series are cointegrated, coefficient matrix αβ’ has reduced rank equal to 1 and 
there exists 2x1 vectors α and β, where the vector β’ is cointegration vector.  
 
It is important to note though that both of these tests might suffer from structural break 
interference which might effect on the end result. 
 
5.5.2.  Vector Error Correlation Model 
 
To investigate the short term relationship between the two markets – previous studies have 
mainly used two different approaches. One approach is called Granger-causality test which 
has been employed by for example Delis and Mylonidis (2010) among others. This method 
requires credit spreads to be integrated of order one and for this reason can be applied to a 
larger number of days than the more basic Gonzalo and Granger (1995) test. This is due to the 
absence of the cointegration requirements in the Gonzalo and Granger method.  
 
Another commonly used method is Vertical Error Correlation Model (VECM). It is a linear 
representation of the stochastic data generation process. Each of the variables in the model is 
considered endogenous, comprising from two components. First, it is a linear function of the 
past realized variables in the system and second, an unpredictable innovation component. 
Following the study of Fontana and Scheicher (2010) among others, I will use the method to 
the study the short-term relationship.  
 
The VECM is constructed as followed: 
 
∆CDS t = c1 + λ1 (CDSt-1 – α – β BY St-1) + ∑ 
1∆	
	 + ∑ 
∆	 		
	  + ɛ1t   ( 6 ) 
 
∆BY S t = c2 + λ2 (CDSt-1 – α – β BY St-1) + ∑ ∆	
  + ∑ ∆	 		
  + ɛ2t      ( 7 ) 
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where CDS t refers to CDS premium at a time t and BY S t refers to bonds’ yield spread at a 
time. ɛ1t and ɛ2t refers to i.i.d shocks. Correction terms α and β refer to cointegration.  
 
If λ1 is negative and significant, it means that the CDS market adjusts to remove the pricing 
errors. This means price discovery is taken in bond market. If λ2 is significant and positive, it 
means that cash market adjusts and price discovery is taken in CDS market. If both 
coefficients are significant and with proper sign, the relative magnitude of the adjustment 
coefficients determines the relative importance of each market in price discovery. 
6. Data 
 
In this section I will describe the data used in the study and also rationalize the choice of it in 
case there exist more than one option for the data which has been commonly used in the 
studies. 
6.1. CDS data 
 
The credit default swap data was obtained from Datastream. Datastream gathers the data from 
Thompson Reuters and Credit Market Analysis (CMA). Original plan was to gather data from 
2001 to 2011 but the time scope had to be re-adjusted due to lack of data in Datastream and 
the young nature of the product. In order to maximize the number of observations and in an 
effort to attain significant results, I limited the study to countries which had quotes available 
May 2nd  2005 onwards till September 20th 2010. This resulted to including 21 countries17 in 
the study and excluding 51 countries. The 21 countries included represent Asia, Europe, 
Africa and Australia. There was neither a country default in my sample during the time 
period. 
 
The data consist of daily mid quotes of sovereign CDS contracts. I concentrated the study on 
5 year maturity and US dollar denominated quotes since they are standard and most traded. 
All in all I obtained 29 673 observations for the CDS premias in total.  
                                                            
17
 Countries included in the study: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany,  Greece, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, South 
Africa, South Korea and Turkey. 
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6.2. Bond data 
 
Bond data is obtained from Bloomberg Terminal. I use 5 year Generic Yield for the respective 
21 countries. Market for sovereign bond is mostly illiquid which makes reliable data hard to 
obtain. Many of the previous studies have conducted interpolation to gather the needed data. 
This was used for example in the study of Hull et al. (2004). The problem of the method is the 
difficulty of carrying it out for a long period of time due to the need of bonds with maturity 
left before and after the required point. In case of this study it would mean data of a bond with 
maturity left less than five years and a bond with maturity left over five years. In reality the 
number of bonds outstanding is limited with mixed maturities hence creates the problem of 
reliability.   
 
Chen- Lau and Kim (2004) used JPMorgan Chase Emerging Market Bond Index Plus as their 
bond yield reference to overcome the problem. However most commonly used alternative 
method for linear interpolation has been bond yield curve data provided by trading data 
collecting parties. This has been done for example by Palladini and Porter (2011) in their 
study. They used Datastream Market Curve Analysis which was available for nine countries. 
 
For the empirical testing matching maturity of the bond and CDS contracts is important, as 
the default probability changes as the maturity changes. Due to this I decided to use 
Bloomberg Terminal’s 5 year Generic Yield as bond reference data as it provides more 
reliable and smoother approximations. Bonds underlying are both in local currencies and in 
US dollar. This is important to remember as it might impact in the yield through exchange 
rate risk. Even though the risk, CDS contracts are most commonly written in different 
currencies than the underlying bond. As an example when credit event occurs in eurozone we 
might expect euro to depreciate against US dollar. For an investor holding a euro bond and 
USD nominated protection this will result in windfall profit for euro based hedger. However 
CDS premias usually adjust to prevent the exploitation of the possible currency depreciations. 
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6.3. Regression’s variable data 
6.3.1.  Debt to GDP 
 
Debt to GDP refers to bonds outstanding versus GDP. Data was collected from International 
Monetary Fund database which reports Debt to GDP ratio on yearly basis.  
6.3.2.   Exchange rate 
 
Exchange rate refers to local currency over US dollar. I gathered daily data and it was 
collected from Datastream.  
6.3.3.   US Treasury Yield 
 
US Treasury Yield data was collected from webpage of Board of Governors of Federal 
Reserve System. Data is collected on daily basis with 5 year maturity.  
 
US Treasury Yield is also used as the risk free rate in this study. This is done as the sample 
group contains countries all over the world and not just Europe region when German bund 
rate would have been more appropriate. US Treasury Yield is also seen to have greater 
liquidity than any other bond (cf. Feldhutter and Land, 2008; Longstaff, 2004), which can be 
then interpreted as less risky. However it has been argued that the T-bill rate is lower than 
what the funding costs are for the investor and therefore not appropriate risk-free benchmark. 
Due to this some studies (cf. Fontana and Scheicher, 2010) use swap rate as a proxy for risk-
free. Swap rate is not a frictionless solution either. It has argued to include systematic risk 
which arises from the financial institutions. 
6.3.4 US Stock Market data and  European Stock Market data 
 
To investigate US Stock Market I am using MSCI US which has been collected on daily basis 
from Datastream. 
 
To catch the effect of European business cycle, I am using European Stock Market data is 
MSCI Europe which has also been collected on daily basis from Datastream. 
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6.3.4 VIX and iTraxx 
 
Data for the both variables have been collected from Datastream on daily basis.  
6.3.5 Counterparty 
 
Data used for counterparty variable is main dealers’ CDS mid price data. Data is collected 
from Bloomberg on daily basis, however, data for all the banks were not available for both 
periods. For the first period only six banks, Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, 
JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo, were included in the sample. For the 
second period all of the banks were included in the sample. 
6.3.6 Bid-Ask spread 
 
Data is bid and ask CDS quotes from the sample countries when available18. Data is collected 
from Datastream on daily basis.  
7. Results and analysis  
 
In this section I will test and present the results of my hypothesis which are summarized in 
Table 1 below. I will also further analyze the results and their implications. 
  
                                                            
18
  These countries include: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa and South Korea.   
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Table 1. Hypothesis 
Hypothesis Method used 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Overtime basis does not always equal 
to zero, therefore there is possibility for arbitrage. the Basis 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The basis is higher in emerging 
markets then in the developed markets over time. 
the Basis 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The basis move in clusters according 
to geographical regions, Europe, Asia, Africa and 
Australia. 
Clustering analysis 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): US Stock return and US Treasury 
yield have a significant impact on the basis in majority of 
the countries. 
Multiple regression 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Liquidity variable has a significant 
impact on the basis in majority of the countries. Multiple regression 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Price discovery takes place in the 
bond market before the financial crisis. 
Johansen’s cointegration and 
VECM 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Price discovery takes place in the 
CDS market during the financial crisis. 
Johansen’s cointegration and 
VECM 
 
7.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
7.1.1 Descriptive statistics of CDS 
 
Table 2 and 3 show the descriptive statistics of CDS dataset. During the whole maturity CDS 
premia varied between 3,43 and 1602,56 basis points. 
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Table 2.   Descriptive Statistics for Sovereign Credit Default Swap Premias.  This table reports 
summary statistics for daily premias for five-year sovereign CDS contracts from the 2nd of May 2005 to the 11th of September 
2008 period. CDS premias are measured in basis points. 
 
Country Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Median Maximum N 
Austria 3,895 3,294 0,5 2,1 13,5 880 
Australia 15,698 12,774 2,4 13,8 78,3 880 
Belgium 6,429 7,672 1,0 2,5 33,6 880 
Czech Republic 13,618 12,698 4,3 7,4 66,2 880 
Denmark 10,748 17,977 1,6 5,2 200,6 880 
Germany 3,430 2,371 0,6 2,4 13,8 880 
Greece 18,503 15,689 4,4 13,3 69,8 880 
Hong Kong 15,863 15,135 1,4 10,0 70,0 880 
Hungary 48,316 40,415 15,0 31,4 210,7 880 
Indonesia 191,398 56,952 91,4 191,4 320,0 880 
Ireland 10,262 10,640 1,5 5,2 66,2 880 
Italy 15,663 11,550 5,3 10,5 50,1 880 
Japan 8,703 6,869 2,0 5,7 56,7 880 
Norway 6,738 4,752 1,0 6,0 22,9 880 
Pakistan 312,031 175,893 146,2 235,0 1000,0 880 
Poland 23,798 17,200 6,8 17,0 97,8 880 
Portugal 12,771 11,851 3,4 7,6 49,7 880 
Sweden 17,678 20,973 1,0 9,0 160,8 880 
South Africa 73,533 51,711 23,8 53,0 230,4 880 
South Korea 39,694 28,479 14,0 26,4 139,5 880 
Turkey 206,683 52,460 116,9 194,1 351,0 880 
 
 
Table 2 represent the statistics of the first period. There Pakistan had the biggest average CDS 
premia with 312,03 basis points. Smallest average premia was at Germany with 3,43 basis 
points. These countries also had the biggest and smallest standard deviations, Pakistan with 
175,89 basis points and Germany with 2,37 basis points. By looking at the average CDS 
premiums within EU countries, the biggest premium was at Hungary with 48,31 basis points. 
 
On average developed countries have lower average basis premias. European Union countries 
seem to have lower CDS premias on average compared to other developed countries with the 
exception of Hungary, Poland and Greece. Within EU region Eastern European countries 
Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic and South Europe countries Greece and Italy has higher 
average CDS premias then rest of the Europe excluding Sweden which is almost at the same 
level as Greece. 
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Table 3.   Descriptive Statistics for Sovereign Credit Default Swap Premias.  This table reports 
summary statistics for daily premias for five-year sovereign CDS contracts from the 12th of September 2008 to the 30th of 
September 2010. CDS premias are measured in basis points. 
 
Country Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Median Maximum N 
Austria 93,786 44,234 12,5 83,9 273,0 534 
Australia 63,467 35,476 20,5 50,7 189,4 534 
Belgium 74,824 34,847 21,5 63,5 157,8 534 
Czech Republic 119,977 60,488 49,0 95,0 350,0 534 
Denmark 54,078 32,264 13,5 40,2 147,8 534 
Germany 37,226 14,957 8,5 36,2 91,9 534 
Greece 331,574 264,658 51,9 235,6 1125,8 534 
Hong Kong 71,442 29,315 36,8 58,6 162,1 534 
Hungary 317,319 109,658 140,7 314,4 638,4 534 
Indonesia 334,576 222,296 140,5 206,9 1256,7 534 
Ireland 198,264 80,507 31,2 179,9 489,8 534 
Italy 125,969 46,750 41,6 116,4 244,7 534 
Japan 62,185 20,543 16,5 64,3 120,7 534 
Norway 26,134 11,168 7,5 23,3 65,3 534 
Pakistan 1602,560 892,027 473,3 1863,7 5105,7 534 
Poland 168,798 71,655 57,3 139,3 417,6 534 
Portugal 139,932 98,401 40,5 95,8 461,3 534 
Sweden 60,528 31,935 12,0 49,5 160,8 534 
South Africa 230,539 119,375 114,2 169,5 683,3 534 
South Korea 186,542 117,765 73,3 131,4 700,0 534 
Turkey 268,412 123,836 153,8 202,3 849,2 534 
 
In the second period biggest average CDS premia and biggest standard deviation was at 
Pakistan with 1602,56 basis points and with 892,03 basis points. Smallest average premia was 
at Norway with 26,1 basis points as well as the smallest standard deviation of 11,16 basis 
points. Within EU region the biggest average CDS premia was obtained from Greece with 
331,57 basis points. This was the third biggest average CDS premium among the sample 
group. 
 
In the second period developed countries on average had lower average CDS premias and 
standard deviation. The biggest growth in premias however was seen in Europe where CDS 
premiums grew on average 103 basis points (excluding Greece) compared to rest of the world 
where the growth was 95 basis points (excluding Pakistan). Average CDS premias changed 
the least between first and second periods in Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Germany. 
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7.1.2 Descriptive statistics of Bond Yield Spread 
 
Table 4 and 5 show the descriptive statistics of bond yield over a risk free rat of US Treasury 
bill. During the whole maturity bond yield spread varied between –3,09 and 10,83 basis 
points. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Sovereign Bond Yield Spreads. This table reports summary statistics for 
daily spreads for five-year sovereign bond yields over five year US T-bill yields from the 2nd of May 2005 to the 11th of 
September 2008 period. Bond yield spreads are measured in basis points. 
 
Country Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Median Maximum N 
Austria -0,467 0,945 -1,59 -0,75 1,52 880 
Australia 1,714 0,965 0,48 1,34 4,06 880 
Belgium -0,432 0,960 -1,55 -0,78 1,61 880 
Czech Republic -0,565 1,137 -1,73 -1,13 2,14 880 
Denmark -0,377 1,070 -1,65 -0,79 2,10 880 
Germany -0,497 0,875 -1,52 -0,77 1,37 880 
Greece -0,303 1,000 -1,46 -0,64 1,85 880 
Hong Kong -0,405 0,242 -1,00 -0,40 0,21 880 
Hungary 3,126 1,265 1,44 2,71 6,98 880 
Indonesia 6,794 1,912 3,42 6,77 11,82 880 
Ireland -0,329 0,980 -1,46 -0,68 1,79 880 
Italy -0,329 0,980 -1,46 -0,68 1,79 880 
Japan -3,094 0,633 -3,89 -3,41 -1,48 880 
Norway -0,022 1,024 -1,26 -0,37 2,26 880 
Pakistan 5,846 1,712 4,22 5,14 11,16 880 
Poland 1,225 1,176 -0,30 0,65 4,07 880 
Portugal -0,379 0,952 -1,52 -0,71 1,64 880 
Sweden -0,500 0,990 -1,72 -0,84 1,54 880 
South Africa 3,936 0,942 2,18 3,74 6,20 880 
South Korea 0,957 0,946 -0,22 0,53 3,13 880 
Turkey 2,048 0,631 1,09 1,87 3,86 880 
 
In the first period the biggest average bond yield spread was at Indonesia with 6,79 basis 
points. They also had the biggest standard deviation of 1,91 basis points. Lowest average 
bond yield spread was at Japan with -3,09 basis points. Lowest standard deviation was at 
Hong Kong with 0,242 basis points.  
 
On average European bond yield over US Treasury bill are negative which can reflect as 
bigger trust on European countries with the exceptions of Poland and Hungary. Outside 
Europe Japan has the only negative yield spread.   
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Sovereign Bond Yield Spreads. This table reports summary statistics for 
daily spreads for five-year sovereign bond yields over five year US T-bill yields from the 12th of September 2008 to the 30th 
of September 2010. Bond yield spreads are measured in basis points. 
 
Country Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Median Maximum N 
Austria 0,635 0,562 -0,29 0,39 2,15 534 
Australia 2,611 0,459 1,50 2,73 3,69 534 
Belgium 0,847 0,564 -0,08 0,70 2,35 534 
Czech Republic 1,398 0,623 -0,08 1,30 3,03 534 
Denmark 0,803 0,524 -0,09 0,68 2,32 534 
Germany 0,123 0,435 -0,63 0,02 1,30 534 
Greece 3,732 2,877 0,71 2,95 12,41 534 
Hong Kong -0,446 0,209 -0,96 -0,47 0,18 534 
Hungary 6,337 1,808 3,21 5,67 11,17 534 
Indonesia 7,874 2,360 5,45 6,84 17,31 534 
Ireland 0,992 0,607 -0,08 0,92 2,67 534 
Italy 0,992 0,607 -0,08 0,92 2,67 534 
Japan -1,523 0,398 -2,22 -1,63 -0,41 534 
Norway 0,862 0,421 0,01 0,83 2,12 534 
Pakistan 10,834 1,376 8,83 10,30 14,85 534 
Poland 3,471 0,437 2,30 3,43 5,04 534 
Portugal 1,375 0,846 0,17 1,28 4,26 534 
Sweden 0,284 0,292 -0,29 0,28 1,24 534 
South Africa 6,059 0,423 5,10 5,98 7,17 534 
South Korea 2,453 0,318 1,71 2,46 3,35 534 
Turkey 3,445 1,814 1,42 2,61 11,12 534 
 
In the second period the biggest average bond yield spread was at Pakistan with 10,834 basis 
points and the lowest at Japan with -1,523 basis points. Biggest standard deviation is at 
Greece with 2,877 basis points when the smallest standard deviation is at Sweden with 0,292 
basis points.  
 
On average the bond yield spread grew compared to US T-bill yield which can be interpret as 
a shift in the trust or flight to liquidity from mainly Europe to US. Biggest change in spread is 
at Pakistan and Hungary, but when excluding these the average spread is in EU countries with 
1,60 basis points on average compared to rest of the world with 1,15 basis points. Smallest 
change was at Hong Kong which was the only country which remained with negative spread 
in the second period.   
 
7.1.3 Descriptive statistics of Basis 
 
Tables 6 and 7 show the descriptive statistics of the basis. During the whole maturity the basis 
varied between 3, 92 to 1591,72 basis points.  
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for Sovereign Basis. This table reports summary statistics for daily spreads for 
five-year CDS premia minus corresponding bond yield over US T-bill of each country from the 2nd of May 2005 to the 11th 
of September 2008. Basis is measured in basis points. 
 
 
Country Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Median Maximum N 
Austria 4,362 2,506 1,01 3,32 12,40 880 
Australia 13,985 12,450 1,38 11,14 75,18 880 
Belgium 6,860 6,850 1,84 3,53 32,46 880 
Czech Republic 14,183 11,697 5,40 8,54 64,38 880 
Denmark 11,125 18,139 2,35 6,34 201,73 880 
Germany 3,927 1,729 0,97 3,42 12,99 880 
Greece 18,806 14,929 4,66 14,46 68,15 880 
Hong Kong 16,268 15,106 1,81 10,21 70,46 880 
Hungary 45,190 39,244 13,07 29,00 203,89 880 
Indonesia 184,604 55,310 87,85 184,56 308,74 880 
Ireland 10,591 10,005 2,00 6,51 67,64 880 
Italy 15,992 10,767 5,65 11,36 48,54 880 
Japan 11,797 6,505 5,27 9,05 59,98 880 
Norway 6,761 4,432 1,12 6,02 21,16 880 
Pakistan 306,185 174,328 141,13 230,04 988,88 880 
Poland 22,573 16,236 6,50 16,56 93,73 880 
Portugal 13,150 11,053 3,82 8,61 48,35 880 
Sweden 18,179 21,013 1,77 8,28 161,33 880 
South Africa 69,597 50,937 20,46 49,42 224,20 880 
South Korea 38,736 27,674 13,56 25,88 136,60 880 
Turkey 204,635 51,921 115,75 192,25 348,01 880 
 
In the first period the biggest average basis was at Pakistan with 306,18 basis points. Pakistan 
also had the biggest standard deviation of 171, 32 basis points. Lowest average basis was at 
Germany with 3,92 basis points with the sample group’s lowest standard deviation of 1,72 
basis points. On average EU countries had lower basis compared to non-EU countries.  
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for Sovereign Basis. This table reports summary statistics for daily spreads for 
five-year CDS premia minus corresponding bond yield over US T-bill of each country from the 12th of September 2008 to the 
30th of September 2010. Basis is measured in basis points. 
 
 
Country Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Median Maximum N 
Austria 93,150 43,910 11,04 83,50 271,71 534 
Australia 60,855 35,816 17,56 48,18 187,61 534 
Belgium 73,978 34,676 20,04 62,56 156,40 534 
Czech Republic 118,579 60,062 48,11 93,95 347,67 534 
Denmark 53,275 31,973 11,90 39,51 146,81 534 
Germany 37,104 14,926 7,40 36,13 91,61 534 
Greece 327,842 261,878 50,09 231,89 1116,92 534 
Hong Kong 71,888 29,228 37,45 59,18 162,37 534 
Hungary 310,981 108,055 135,46 308,32 627,40 534 
Indonesia 326,702 220,075 134,52 200,77 1242,88 534 
Ireland 197,273 80,294 29,75 178,24 488,30 534 
Italy 124,977 46,467 40,09 115,63 243,50 534 
Japan 63,708 20,501 17,98 65,97 121,63 534 
Norway 25,273 11,046 5,82 22,43 64,21 534 
Pakistan 1591,726 891,367 462,31 1853,43 5094,29 534 
Poland 165,326 71,393 54,33 135,85 413,64 534 
Portugal 138,557 97,747 38,99 93,99 457,57 534 
Sweden 60,245 31,902 11,16 49,42 160,77 534 
South Africa 224,480 119,129 107,97 163,67 677,51 534 
South Korea 184,089 117,665 71,37 128,88 698,05 534 
Turkey 264,968 122,081 151,83 199,78 838,61 534 
 
In the second period the biggest average basis was at Pakistan with 1591,72 basis points with 
also the biggest standard deviation of 891,36 basis points. Lowest average was at Norway 
with 25,27 basis points with a standard deviation of 11,04 basis points. This was also the 
lowest standard deviation of the sample group. 
 
Biggest change between the periods was at Pakistan (1285,54 basis points) and smallest at 
Norway (18,51 basis points). On average non-EU countries had bigger change (growth of 
242, 82 basis points on average) compared to EU countries (growth of 118,07 basis points on 
average). This reflects basis changes to be more closely related to CDS changes than to bond 
yield spread changes. 
 
7.2. Basis method analysis 
 
Tables 6 and 7 and supported by Figure 8 in appendix show clear deviation from zero in both 
periods. Finding is in line with previous studies (cf. Levy, 2009; Ammer and Cai, 2011) and 
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gives us possibility to state a potential arbitrage opportunity in all of the countries in both 
periods.  
 
Arbitrage opportunity is created through positive basis in both periods in all of the countries. 
Even though there exists a potential opportunity, it is not automatically used. This is due to 
high costs of short selling the bond as the repo market is often illiquid for risky bonds (Blanco 
et al., 2003). On the other hand Adler and Song (2010) find in their study short selling costs to 
be partly responsible for the constant positive basis which is also seen in this study. 
 
Results also show increase in the basis for all of the respective 21 countries from one period 
to another one. This can be seen as investors growing belief in default probability. Persistent 
positive basis is a combination of different factors of which to mention few: 
 
1. According to Ammer and Cai (2011) one of the reasons can be the cheapest to deliver 
option which gives the protection buyer a chance to deliver the least valuable 
instrument that is eligible. This often means protection seller ends up with least 
favorable alternative with least favorable yield. To compensate the risk, protection 
seller requires higher premia.  
 
2. Aunon-Nerin et al (2002) find that changes in ratings have a significant impact on 
sovereign CDS premias. Due to this the possible negative rating changes after the 
financial crisis started, might have increased the basis. Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) 
also find evidence of the CDS of investment grade countries to respond mainly to 
negative credit rating announcements while the spreads of speculative grade countries 
respond largely to positive announcements. They studied the sovereign CDS spreads 
of 22 emerging economies from January 2nd  2001 to April 22nd  2009. 
 
3. Restructuring of debt is a common measure in time of distress and can also increase 
CDS premias and this way influence on the basis (De Witt, 2006). 
 
4. Investors’ view has also influence on the basis. After the financial turmoil started, 
investors have had negative view of market which might have caused investors to buy 
more protections as it is seen easier than borrowing a bond for a short sale. Demand 
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narrows the spreads but the premia is higher as the investors see increased probability 
of default.  
 
Based on the results:  
Hypothesis Result 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Overtime basis does not always equal 
to zero, therefore there is possibility for arbitrage. Accepted for both periods 
 
 
Table 8 presents the average basis spreads for both emerging market and for developed 
market. This finding is in line with general assumptions and Gapen et al. (2005) theory of 
debt volatility influencing pricing. 
  
Table 8. Average basis per market. Table presents the average basis spreads in basis points 
of emerging markets and developed markets in both periods, from 2nd of May 2005 to 11th of 
September 2008 and from 12th of September 2008 to 30th of September 2010. Emerging markets 
include: Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Korea, Pakistan, Poland, South Africa, and 
Turkey. Developed markets include: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. 
 
Market 1st period 
 
2nd period 
 
Emerging Market 92,82 238,29 
Developed Market 12,45 106,67 
 
Based on the results shown in the Table 8.  
Hypothesis Result 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The basis is higher in emerging 
markets then in the developed markets over time. 
Accepted for both periods 
 
7.3. Principal component analysis 
 
Table 9 and 10 illustrate the results of principal component analysis where I attempt to isolate 
a small number of common factors that would explain the correlation patterns. Principal 
component analysis is conducted on CDS, bond yield spread and on basis data for both 
periods. 
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Table 9. Principal Components Analysis Results.  This table reports summary statistics for the principal 
components analysis of the correlation matrix of daily sovereign bond, CDS premia and basis changes of each 
country from the 2nd of May 2005 to the 11th of September 2008. All observations denotes results based on the 
correlation matrix computed using all available overlapping observations for each pair-wise correlation. 
 
Principal component Eigenvalue Difference Percentage Explained 
Cum, 
Percentage 
Explaines 
CDS - First 12,938 11,022 64,692 64,692 
CDS - Second 1,916 0,607 9,581 74,273 
CDS - Third 1,309 0,334 6,545 80,818 
CDS - Fourth 0,975 0,224 4,874 85,692 
Bond Yield Spread - First 16,127 14,538 76,797 76,797 
Bond Yield Spread - Second 1,589 0,429 7,566 84,362 
Bond Yield Spread - Third 1,160 0,746 5,523 89,885 
Bond Yield Spread - Fourth 0,414 0,089 1,973 91,859 
Basis - First 13,490 11,606 64,239 64,239 
Basis - Second 1,884 0,578 8,971 73,210 
Basis - Third 1,306 0,324 6,220 79,430 
Basis - Fourth 0,982 0,198 4,678 84,108 
 
 
The results indicate stronger commonalities in bond yield spreads compared to CDS or basis 
in the first period. First two components capture over 89% of the variation in the correlation 
of bond yield spread matrix while in CDS and basis matrix 80% and 79% of variation was 
captured by first two components.  
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Table 10. Principal Components Analysis Results.  This table reports summary statistics for the principal 
components analysis of the correlation matrix of daily sovereign bond, CDS premia and basis changes of each 
country from the 12th of September 2008 to the 30th of September 2010. All observations denotes results based 
on the correlation matrix computed using all available overlapping observations for each pair-wise correlation. 
 
Principal component Eigenvalue Difference Percentage Explained 
Cum, 
Percentage 
Explaines 
CDS - First 13,059 7,747 62,185 62,185 
CDS - Second 5,312 4,279 25,295 87,480 
CDS - Third 1,033 0,505 4,917 92,397 
CDS - Fourth 0,528 0,201 2,513 94,910 
Bond Yield Spread - First 10,880 7,777 51,811 51,811 
Bond Yield Spread - Second 3,103 1,900 14,775 66,586 
Bond Yield Spread - Third 1,203 0,186 5,727 72,313 
Bond Yield Spread - Fourth 1,017 0,133 4,845 77,158 
Basis - First 12,980 7,622 61,811 61,811 
Basis - Second 5,358 4,313 25,516 87,326 
Basis - Third 1,045 0,511 4,978 92,305 
Basis - Fourth 0,534 0,204 2,543 94,418 
 
 
When moving from period one to period two, situation changes. In period two CDS and basis 
correlation matrix capture over 87 % of the variation in the correlation with the first two 
components while in bond yield spread two components capture only 66 % of the changes in 
variations. Similar findings of principal component changes was done by Fontana and 
Scheicher (2010) in their study, when they conducted a study on Euro area relation.  
 
Overall it can be said that over 50% of the variations of the spreads can be explained by one 
component. Regarding the basis, second component causes over 25% of the variations during 
the time of distress. This is mainly caused by CDS spread which has also 25% of variations 
explained by the second component. In time of distress it seems investors to concentrate on 
following few certain elements instead of just one or in contrary – react to all news. 
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7.4. Clustering analysis 
 
Table 11 reports the results of clustering analysis. In both periods Pakistan is in its own 
cluster. As a robustness check I tried also with fewer clusters as well as more and the result 
stayed the same. This means Pakistan’s basis to have unique correlation compared to others as 
the algorithm tries to form groups so that the correlation between the countries in the same 
group is maximized.  
 
Table 11. Sovereign Credit Clusters. This table reports the clusters formed on the basis of the correlation 
matrix of daily changes in sovereign basis spreads. The pair wise correlations in the correlation matrix are 
computed using all available overlapping observations for the two sovereigns. Ave. Basis Spread is the average 
basis value taken over all daily observations for all sovereigns within a cluster and reported in basis points. Ave. 
Corr. Internal denotes the average correlation among sovereigns within each cluster.  
 
Period 1  May 2005  - September 2008 
Country Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 
Countries  
in Cluster 
Austria 
Australia 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Hong Kong 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Sweden 
Hungary 
South Korea 
South Africa 
Turkey 
Indonesia 
Pakistan 
Ave. Basis Spread 12,571 51,175 194,619 306,184 
Ave. Corr. Internal 0,505 0,971 0,734 N/A 
 
Period 2  September 2008 - September 2010 
Country Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 
Countries  
in Cluster 
Austria 
Australia 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Germany 
Hong Kong 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Sweden 
Hungary 
Indonesia 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Turkey 
Greece Pakistan 
Ave. Basis Spread 91,728 262,244 327,842 1591,726 
Ave. Corr. Internal 0,645 0,941 N/A N/A 
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In the first period Indonesia and Turkey had high internal average correlation of 0,734. 
However, even higher was the average internal correlation in cluster two where Hungary, 
South Korea and South Africa are located. They had internal average correlation of 0,971. In 
the second period all of the five countries were located in the same cluster with extremely 
high internal correlation of 0,941 and also the highest individual average premias of the whole 
sample group excluding Pakistan. This can be interpreted to mean that the countries are seen 
to have equally good or bad situation and the news from the market affects them the same 
way. This leads to the basis to move highly correlated. 
 
In first period cluster one with the most of the countries has an average internal correlation of 
0,505. Countries included in the cluster seem to be stable developed countries with low 
average basis before crisis. In the second period Greece is detached from the group to form a 
separate cluster. This can be seen as the result of the crisis Greece is facing at the moment and 
the sensitivity of its basis to variable changes compared to other countries. Although Ireland 
faced banking crisis, it has not had as big impact on CDS and bond prices as Greece and it has 
been able to stay in the so called stable group.  
 
In contrary to Longstaff et al. (2008) findings, clusters were not formed according to 
geographical regions. My sample group’s basis seem to be affected more by the credit risk 
than geographical factors. This assumption can be supported by the move of Greece to its own 
cluster in the second period.   
 
Based on this: 
Hypothesis Result 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The basis move in clusters according 
to geographical regions, Europe, Asia, Africa and 
Australia. 
Rejected in both periods 
 
  
55 
 
 
7.5. Regression analysis 
 
To examine the factors causing the basis to change I ran multiple regression for each country 
using nine explanatory variables, with Newey-West standard errors and three lags. I used 
Newey-West to correct autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity from the residuals. This way 
OLS estimates are still unbiased but autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity is no longer 
efficient.  
 
Tables 12 and 13 report the Newey-West t-statistics of the corresponding regression variables 
and the number of observations for each country of the sample group. Significance of one-, 
five- and ten-percent level is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
7.5.1.  Analysis of the first period 
 
In the first period variable VIX is the most significant variable. VIX is significant for 14 
countries out of 21. For other variables significance is detected in less than half of the sample 
group. This finding is in line with the results of principal component analysis which implied 
one common factor to capture over 60% of the changes. 
 
Deviations of the basis line are big according to R2 value. On average R2 is small, below 10 
%, besides Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey.  
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Table 12. Results of the Regression of the Change of Daily Basis Spreads on the Local Variables, 
Global Variables, Risk Variables and Liquidity Variable. This table reports the Newey-West t-statistics 
of the corresponding regression variables, as well as the R2 and the number of observations for each country 
from the 2nd of May 2005 to the 11th of September 2008. Significance at the one-, five and ten percent level is 
denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
Variable 
Local Variables Global Variables Risk Variables Liquidity Variable 
 
Debt to 
GDP 
Exchange 
rate 
US 
Treasury 
Yield 
US Stock 
Market 
Europe 
Stock 
Market 
iTraxx 
Europe VIX Counterparty 
Bid-Ask 
Spread R
2 
# obs 
Austria -1,75* 0,44 0,05 -1,12 -2,60*** -1,30 1,38 0,41 2,16** 0,018 879 
Australia  -0,62 0,09 -0,10 -1,63* -1,02 -0,04 -1,92** -0,09 1,40 0,019 879 
Belgium -0,69 1,97** 2,01** -0,56 0,94 0,66 2,91*** -0,00 0,79 0,027 879 
Czech Republic -0,48 0,20 -0,07 0,98 -0,61 0,44 2,31** 2,83* 1,02 0,017 879 
Denmark 0,24 1,03 1,00 -0,20 1,63* 0,95 -0,48 - 0,21 0,42 0,004 879 
Germany -0,39 1,18 0,72 -0,29 -1,88* -1,10 1,45 0,92 2,50** 0,023 879 
Greece  
-
3,04*** 0,38 0,52 -3,39*** -0,58 1,82* 2,04** 1,16 -0,38 0,014 879 
Hong Kong -0,15 0,71 0,07 0,78 0,60 0,58 1,99** 0,28 2,57*** 0,328 879 
Hungary 0,30 3,08*** -0,44 3,37*** 0,11 1,55 2,95*** -1,56 0,96 0,099 879 
Indonesia  0,93 5,06*** -5,56*** 0,99 1,48 0,39 6,14*** 1,40 0,24 0,198 879 
Ireland -2,19** 0,25 1,27 -4,36*** 0,96 1,09 0,98 - 0,67 -1,08 0,003 879 
Italy 0,39 -0,52 1,88* 2,09** 1,79* 2,27** 4,46*** 3,59* -0,44 0,067 879 
Japan  -1,89* 0,31 0,90 -2,82*** -0,76 -1,01 1,51 0,80 -0,11 0,010 879 
Norway  -0,78 1,47 2,81*** 1,20 1,66* 0,40 2,42** - 0,57 -1,47 0,005 879 
Pakistan  0,70 1,21 -1,50 1,38 -1,20 0,18 4,30*** 0,93 1,70* 0,091 879 
Poland  -2,39** 2,36** -0,04 0,66 0,65 1,62* 2,62 - 0,10 0,96 0,088 879 
Portugal  0,34 0,63 1,52 1,00 1,90* 2,98*** 5,25*** 0,99 2,35** 0,085 879 
Sweden 
-
3,31*** -0,66 -0,02 -3,11*** 1,74* 1,15 0,29 -1,51 2,18** 0,013 879 
South Africa  1,68* 4,70*** -4,12*** 3,12*** -1,14 0,07 7,16*** 1,31 0,70 0,178 879 
South Korea  -0,29 5,36*** -3,55*** 0,46 -0,77 0,84 7,65*** 1,13 1,63* 0,171 879 
Turkey 1,73* 14,39*** -1,62* 0,96 -0,85 -0,53 7,90*** 1,48 1,25 0,459 879 
 
 
The relationship between Debt to GDP and the basis tends to be negative and is significant for 
eight countries. This is in line with the study of Fontana and Scheicher (2011). However 
finding is surprising as it means basis grows as the debt decreases. One explanation could be 
flight to quality phenomenon (Beber et al., 2009). If debt decreases, it means default 
probability decreases. During non-crisis time flight to quality causes yields to go down on 
well rated bonds. If CDS premia stays unchanged due to other factors, basis would grow.  
 
Exchange rates tend to have a positive relationship with basis and it is significant for seven 
countries. Higher basis refers to local currency depreciation. This in line with the results of 
Longstaff et al. (2010) and Carr and Wu (2006) who studied the relationship between CDS 
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premias and exchange rates. Currency depreciation is seemed to be linked in credit quality 
worsening and thus creates higher CDS premias. What is notable is that variable is significant 
only for non-euro countries referring to stable and strong euro and stable political and 
economical situation before crisis.  
 
US Treasury yield has both negative and positive relationship with the basis depending on the 
country and it is significant for seven countries. However countries whose basis is 
significantly influenced by US Treasury Yield tend to have negative basis. This could be 
explained by flight to liquidity as US Treasury is seen safer or more liquid than respective 
countries’ bonds. Cossin and Hricko (2001) find in their study lower corporate CDS premias 
be linked to higher borrowing costs and hence lower credit quality. In sovereigns, positive 
basis on the other hand, could be explained by higher inflation expectations which could 
possibly lead to tightening of Federal Reserve’s monetary policy. This again would lead to 
slower economic growth in US and this way also influences other countries.  
 
US Stock Market has also both negative and positive relationship with the basis depending on 
the country and it is significant for eight countries. Countries whose basis is significantly 
influenced by US Stock Market tend to have negative relationship. This is in line with the 
findings of Longstaff et al. (2010). Decreased returns can be seen as a sign of slower 
economic growth and reflect the uncertainty of the future. Investors may react to this by 
increasing the CDS premias. 
 
Relationship between the basis and European Stock Market is fairly equally split between 
positive and negative values and it is significant for seven countries. However as in US Stock 
Market, countries which are significantly influence by the variable tend to have negative 
relationship. Variable is significant only to European countries referring investors to assume 
local impact.  
 
iTraxx has a clear positive relationship with the basis. This means corporate derivative 
markets and sovereign derivative markets tend to follow each other. Variable is significant 
only to Portugal, Italy, Greece and Poland. 
 
VIX has a positive relationship with the basis and is significant for 14 countries. This finding 
is in line with the study of Arce et al. (2012). This tells us that as the fear or uncertainty of the 
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future grows, the more are the investors willing to pay for credit risk protection. Growing 
CDS premias and illiquid bond market creates opportunity for growing basis.  
 
Counterparty risk has both positive and negative relationship with the basis. Only two have 
statistically significant results which are both with positive sign. This is surprising as it means 
that basis increases as the default risk increases. Probability of default is linked to the 
counterparties’ CDS premias. This means that dealer would still be able to charge the same or 
even higher premia from sold CDS contract even though the counterparty’s own default risk 
increases. This could refer market to overlook the counterparty risk posed before the crisis.  
 
Bid-Ask Spread of CDS market has a positive relationship with the basis and is significant in 
seven countries. Higher bid-ask spread implies a less liquid CDS market and this way can 
drive basis up. This is in line with the study of Levy (2009) who finds strong support of 
illiquidity of CDS contracts to the rising CDS premias in the emerging markets. 
 
When reflecting the regression results to cluster analysis results, there can be see one trend. 
Countries in cluster two and three are significantly influenced by variables VIX and 
exchanger rate. This might refer to investors views of seeing these countries risky which is 
already shown in high basis. Exchange risk might be reflecting the instability of political and 
economical factors. For cluster four, Pakistan, liquidity and VIX are significantly influenced.  
 
7.5.2. Analysis of the second period 
 
In the second period most significant variable is Exchange rate followed by US Treasury 
Yield, Europe Stock Market and Bid-Ask Spread. Exchange rate is significant for 18 
countries out of 21, followed by US Treasury Yield to be significant for 17 countries out of 
21. Principal component analysis results showed two components to explain over 87 % of the 
variation.  
 
In second period R2 value grows throughout the sample group. However the value is not very 
high as it remains between 9% and 53%.  
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Table 13. Results of the Regression of the Change of Daily Basis Spreads on the Local Variables, 
Global Variables, Risk Variables and Liquidity Variable. This table reports the Newey-West t-statistics 
of the corresponding regression variables, as well as the R2 and the number of observations for each country 
from the 12th of September 2008 to the 30th of September 2010. Significance at the one-, five and ten percent 
level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
Variable 
Local Variables Global Variables Risk Variables Liquidity Variable 
 
Debt to 
GDP 
Exchange 
rate 
US 
Treasury 
Yield 
US Stock 
Market 
Europe 
Stock 
Market 
iTraxx 
Europe VIX Counterparty 
Bid-Ask 
Spread R
2
 
# obs 
Austria -0,51 5,02*** -4,45*** -1,36 -4,33*** 1,02 -2,80*** - 0,68 3,47*** 0,270 534 
Australia  -1,05 2,30** -0,34 0,15 -1,82* 2,64*** -0,20 - 0,95 1,59 0,187 534 
Belgium -0,75 4,62*** -4,76*** -1,88 -2,20** 0,39 -1,16 - 0,07 1,50 0,183 534 
Czech Republic -0,34 5,56*** -3,83*** -1,24 -2,10** 0,63 -3,13*** -0,08 2,74*** 0,259 534 
Denmark -1,06 4,34*** -2,89*** -2,15 -2,57** -0,09 -1,44 - 0,45 4,29*** 0,218 534 
Germany 0,91 3,65*** -1,80* -4,22*** -2,49** -0,79 -0,67 0,52 2,99*** 0,193 534 
Greece  -0,58 4,78*** -3,75*** -2,07** -2,63*** -0,83 -0,78 - 0,64 3,00*** 0,134 534 
Hong Kong 0,26 0,80 -1,33 -1,59* -0,67 1,33 1,87* - 0,89 -0,66 0,118 534 
Hungary 3,02*** 6,55*** -4,81*** -2,40** -1,02 -0,36 -1,37 1,78 1,30 0,390 534 
Indonesia  -1,11 2,85*** -5,49*** -1,68* -1,08 0,62 -2,69*** - 0,26 3,99*** 0,434 534 
Ireland -0,91 3,43*** -1,61* -2,40** -3,48*** 0,31 -2,28** - 0,74 0,31 0,172 534 
Italy 0,29 5,86*** -4,10*** -1,81* -3,23*** 0,21 -1,87* - 0,99 3,43*** 0,226 534 
Japan  -1,28 -1,04 -0,73 -0,58 -3,23*** 0,55 0,13 0,26 2,19** 0,209 534 
Norway  -0,80 2,57*** -1,46 -1,00 -1,87* 0,30 -1,23 0,50 1,30 0,082 534 
Pakistan  -0,96 1,04 -2,68*** -0,67 0,10 0,19 1,71** - 0,16 1,24 0,094 534 
Poland  -0,95 8,78*** -4,83*** -1,04 -3,02*** -0,55 -2,11** - 0,09 2,14** 0,368 534 
Portugal  -0,28 5,03*** -3,71*** -1,91** -3,48*** -0,47 -1,53 - 0,01 4,75*** 0,176 534 
Sweden -0,87 4,56*** -3,40*** -1,26 -3,58*** 1,91* -1,98** 0,44 2,66*** 0,220 534 
South Africa  1,49 7,59*** -5,23*** -2,49** -1,83* 0,27 -2,10** -0,82 3,48*** 0,398 534 
South Korea  1,41 7,15*** -5,14*** -1,07 -0,62 1,07 -1,30 - 0,32 4,71*** 0,383 534 
Turkey 2,27** 11,43*** -5,01*** -2,00** -1,35 0,63 -2,70*** 1,03 2,59*** 0,534 534 
 
 
Debt to GDP has negative relationship with the basis in the second period as well. However 
the variable is significant only in two countries, in Hungary and Turkey which both have 
positive relationship with the basis. This means as the debt increases, the basis increases as 
well reflecting default probability to be priced in the premias. 
 
Exchange rate has again positive relationship with the basis. Variable is significant in 18 
countries out of 21 and includes all European countries. This could refer to the arising 
concerns over economical stability in the respective countries. Only Hong Kong, Japan and 
Pakistan did not have exchange rate as significant variable.    
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US Treasury Yield has clear negative relationship with the basis in the second period. 
Variable is also significant in 17 countries which could refer liquidity to move to US bonds 
from other bonds as US is seen to be one of the most liquid bonds and thus driving the yield 
down of the US Treasury Yield. This can also create problems in repo markets and grow the 
costs of short selling. This could limit the possible arbitrage opportunities even though the 
positive basis has increased since the first period. 
 
US Stock market has a negative relationship with the basis. However variable is only 
significant to 10 countries which is less than what Longstaff et al. (2010) study finds. They 
concluded US Markets to have big influence on CDS premias changes in most of the 
countries in the sample group.  This could be interpreted as slow economic growth after crisis 
has an influence on the basis. 
 
European Stock Market has a negative relationship with the basis in the second period. 
Variable is also significant for 15 out of 21 countries which is a clear change from the first 
period. This can indicate investors worry over Europe’s economy and its influence on the 
global scope. 
 
iTraxx has positive relationship with the basis in the second period as well, but significant 
only for Australia and Sweden. 
  
In the second period VIX variable surprisingly changes from having positive relationship to 
having a negative relationship with the basis. Change of the sign of the basis when entering 
the period of the distress was also the finding of Arce et al. (2012). This would refer the 
volatility in the stock market to decrease while default probability of sovereigns grow. This 
could be caused by two opposite views – future is seen negatively and hopes of growth stay 
low keeping volatility low or governments are seen to help through financial packages while 
it deteriorates governments’ budgets. The significance of the variable also decreased to 11 
countries in the second period. 
 
In the second period counterparty risk has a negative relationship with basis which is in line 
with the findings of Arce et al. (2012) and Arora et al. (2010), however surprisingly the 
variable is not significant in any country. This could reflect investors to recognize the 
counterparty risk but not as much to have a significant impact. Question relays also on how 
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much financial rescue packages to financial institutions during the crisis have impacted on 
banks’ CDS premias by lowering them and thus keeping counterparty risk under control. 
Negative relationship refers dealer’s default probability to increase, while the CDS premias’ 
charged by the dealer are reduced.  This then reflects on basis through narrowing it as the 
default probability grows.  
 
Bid-Ask Spread variable has positive relationship with the basis also in the second period. 
However there is a clear change in significance. Variable is now significant in 15 countries 
out of 21. This is in line with Levy (2009) study among others.  This could indicate investors 
to follow more closely to the liquidity of the markets and also this way effect on price 
discovery place. 
 
By looking at the cluster analysis, the cluster separation cannot be explained through 
regression. All of the clusters have the same most significant variables. 
 
Out of nine variables, US related variables represent two of them. In the first period the most 
significant variable was risk variable VIX and in the second period most significant variable 
is exchange rate. Both of the US variables were not significant for most of the countries in the 
sample group in the first period but US Treasury Yield variable was second significant 
variable in the second period with 17 countries out of 21. However US Stock Market was 
significant only for 10 countries also in the second period. Based on these results I can reject 
my fourth hypothesis of US Treasury Yield or US Stock Market having significant impact on 
the basis in majority of the countries in the first period, but cannot completely reject or accept 
in the second period. 
 
Liquidity variable was significant only for seven countries in the first period. Significance 
grew for the second period and it was significant for 14 countries. Based on this I will reject 
my fifth hypothesis in the first period but accept in the second period. 
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Hypothesis Result 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): US Stock return and US Treasury 
yield have a significant impact on the basis in majority of 
the countries. 
Rejected in the first period but 
undetermined in the second. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Liquidity variable has a significant 
impact on the basis in majority of the countries. 
Rejected in the first period, but 
accepted in the second period. 
 
7.6.  Price discovery analysis 
7.6.1. Analysis of  Unit root and Cointegration  
 
Price discovery process testing is done in three steps. First I conducted Augmented Duckey-
Fuller Unit Root Test for both CDS premias as well as bond yield spreads. As results show in 
the Table 14, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at 5% level. This means time 
series of both variables in all countries show clear signs of stationary and are all statistically 
significant.  
 
Next I conduct Johansen’s Test for cointegration to examine the long term relationship of 
CDS premias and bond yield spreads. Results are shown in the Table 13. Results show clear 
cointegration rank of one in all of the countries for both periods. This contradicts the results 
of Fontana and Scheicher (2010) who find cointegration during crisis but not in the period 
before. Our results indicate that even though they can deviate from the equilibrium for short 
period of time, they will return back in to it in the long run.  
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Table 14. Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and Johansen’s Test for Cointegration for 
CDS and bond yield spread relationship. Dickey-Fuller columns presents the result of Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test, where null hypothesis of stationary time series at 5% level is indicated by *. Trace test 
presents the results of Johansen’s Test for Cointegration. Rejection of null hypothesis of Zero Cointegration 
Vectors is indicated by *. 
Period 1  May 2005  - September 2008 
Country Dickey-Fuller CDS Dickey-Fuller Bond  Trace Test 
Austria -21,24* -16,68* 834,2* 
Australia -19,80* -16,95* 840,16* 
Belgium -22,01* -16,68* 893,16* 
Czech Republic -19,49* -14,75* 732,14* 
Denmark -17,45* -16,31* 704,11* 
Germany -20,98* -16,54* 874,51* 
Greece -18,43* -16,73* 728,20* 
Hong Kong -17,93* -15,26* 713,55* 
Hungary -15,45* -15,65* 680,45* 
Indonesia -15,90* -16,20* 644,12* 
Ireland -18,06* -17,05* 739,53* 
Italy -19,28* -17,05* 743,94* 
Japan -20,99* -17,07* 856,05* 
Norway -17,60* -17,85* 727,90* 
Pakistan -17,27* -15,35* 795,51* 
Poland -16,36* -16,87* 668,81* 
Portugal -20,27* -16,83* 774,72* 
Sweden -16,32* -16,38* 712,07* 
South Africa -14,97* -17,39* 711,58* 
South Korea -14,90* -17,19* 712,23* 
Turkey -16,52* -14,62* 634,91* 
 
Period 2  September 2008 - September 2010 
Country Dickey-Fuller CDS Dickey-Fuller Bond  Trace Test 
Austria -11,53* -14,28* 413,17* 
Australia -13,10* -13,50* 414,80* 
Belgium -12,40* -12,98* 385,07* 
Czech Republic -12,24* -13,57* 448,23* 
Denmark -11,69* -13,34* 428,78* 
Germany -11,63* -14,26* 414, 62* 
Greece -12,76* -13,49* 393,67* 
Hong Kong -13,02* -12,92* 435,77* 
Hungary -11,72* -12,16* 343,59* 
Indonesia -12,25* -12,66* 486,29* 
Ireland -12,45* -15,15* 422,83* 
Italy -12,94* -15,15* 434,66* 
Japan -12,09* -13,38* 420,16* 
Norway -13,98* -14,14* 433,27* 
Pakistan -14,57* -9,99* 360,26* 
Poland -12,08* -11,93* 390,34* 
Portugal -12,21* -14,52* 413,73* 
Sweden -10,84* -12,99* 380,92* 
South Africa -12,41* -12,94* 395,18* 
South Korea -12,06* -12,34* 432,73* 
Turkey -12,58* -11,57* 497,90* 
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7.6.2.  Analysis of Lead-lag relationship 
 
Stationary and cointegrated results gives me the possibility of running VECM for both 
periods for all of the countries. VECM gives me more information about the short term 
relationship between the CDS market and the bond market. Results can be seen in the table 15 
and 16. 
 
Table 15. Results of VECM test for CDS and bond yield spread relationship. Lambda 1(λ1) and 
Lambda 2 (λ2) refers to coefficients of the results for each country from the 2nd of May 2005 to the 11th of 
September 2008. Significance at the five percent level is denoted by * respectively. If λ1 is negative and 
significant, it means that the CDS market adjusts to remove the pricing errors. This means price discovery is 
taken in bond market. If λ2 is significant and positive, it means that cash market adjusts and price discovery is 
taken in CDS market. If both coefficients are significant and with proper sign, the relative magnitude of the 
adjustment coefficients determines the relative importance of each market in price discovery. 
 
Country Lamda 1 Lamda 2 Price discovery market 
Austria -1,443* 0,002 Bond 
Australia -1,313* 0,002 Bond 
Belgium -1,595* -0,017 Bond 
Czech Republic -1,281* 0,002 Bond 
Denmark -0,942* 0,001* Both 
Germany -1,527* 0,004 Bond 
Greece -1,115* -0,072* Bond 
Hong Kong -1,082* 0,021 Bond 
Hungary -0,498* 0,099* Both 
Indonesia -0,330* 0,194* Both 
Ireland -1,026* 0,002* Both 
Italy -1,178* -0,214 Bond 
Japan -1,386* 0,031* Both 
Norway -0,005 0,007* CDS 
Pakistan -1,025* -0,008 Bond 
Poland 0,001 0,008* CDS 
Portugal -1,296* -0,057* Bond  
Sweden -0,123* -0,001* Bond 
South Africa -0,008 0,024* CDS 
South Korea -0,067* 0,065* Bond 
Turkey -0,904* 0,071* Both 
 
In the first period in only three of the countries price discovery takes place in the derivative 
markets. These were Norway, Poland and South Africa. According to Fontana and 
Scheicher’s (2010) idea of price discovery taking place in the market where investors trade 
the most refers bond market to be illiquid compared to CDS market in these three countries, 
although this cannot be confirmed by regression results. Bond market result is not significant 
either referring to CDS market to receive information first and move first while bond market 
adjust afterwards.  
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In six of the countries lead-lag relationship cannot be able to determine. Both of the markets 
have statistically significant coefficients referring to receiving information and absorbing it in 
both markets. What is common to these six countries according to regression results was the 
significance of liquidity variable. This could refer that both markets receive the information at 
the same time but the price discovery place changes depending on where the liquidity is 
greater for the time being. This would be in line with the study of Levy (2009). 
 
In twelve countries, which is majority of my sample group, price discovery takes place in the 
bond market. When looking at the regression results of liquidity variable, all of the countries 
with bond market as price discovery location, have strong positive relationship with the basis 
and 7 of them are significant. This could refer the CDS markets to be illiquid and therefore 
move the price discovery to the bond market.  
 
Clusters do not define or explain in which market the price discovery takes place. For 
example cluster 2 includes Hungary which has price discovery in CDS market, South Africa 
where bond market leads and South Korea where price discovery is undetermined. This 
confirms previous studies which state price discovery to be country depended.  
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Table 16. Results of VECM test for CDS and bond yield spread relationship. Lambda 1(λ1) and 
Lambda 2 (λ2) refers to coefficients of the results for each country from the 12th of September 2008 to the 30th of 
September 2010. Significance at the five percent level is denoted by * respectively. If λ1 is negative and 
significant, it means that the CDS market adjusts to remove the pricing errors. This means price discovery is 
taken in bond market. If λ2 is significant and positive, it means that cash market adjusts and price discovery is 
taken in CDS market. If both coefficients are significant and with proper sign, the relative magnitude of the 
adjustment coefficients determines the relative importance of each market in price discovery. 
 
Country Lamda 1 Lamda 2 Price discovery market 
Austria -0,087* -0,074* Bond 
Australia -0,453* -0,143* Bond 
Belgium -0,772* -1,090* Bond 
Czech Republic -0,053 0,094* CDS 
Denmark -0,240* 0,027* Both 
Germany 0,018 -0,041* CDS 
Greece -0,158* -0,117* Bond 
Hong Kong -0,674* 0,320* Both 
Hungary -0,125 0,176* CDS 
Indonesia -0,306* 0,289* Both 
Ireland -0,126* -0,063* Bond 
Italy -0,122* -0,064* Bond 
Japan -1,157* 0,058 Bond 
Norway -0,396* -0,160* Bond 
Pakistan -1,102* 0,008 Bond 
Poland -0,559* 0,069* Both 
Portugal 0,027* 0,024* CDS 
Sweden -0,028 -0,153* CDS 
South Africa -0,196* -0,037* Bond 
South Korea -0,384* 0,106* Both 
Turkey -0,776* 0,508* Both 
 
 
In the second period five of the countries in my sample group have CDS market as price 
discovery location. All of the five countries are different then in the first period, meaning 
price discovery place has changed during the time of distress. In the first period, these five 
countries had bond market as price discovery place. By looking at the regression results, most 
of these five countries changed from not having significant impact on the basis from exchange 
rate, US Treasury Yield, US Stock market and Bid-Ask liquidity to having a significant 
impact. All of the five countries are also located in Europe. Exchange rate can be referring to 
instability in the countries which might drive the price discovery to the CDS market. At the 
same time liquidity is moving to US from respective countries, which also favors CDS 
market, even though the CDS market liquidity variable showed CDS market to be illiquid. 
 
In the second period, in six countries the place for price discovery is undetermined and have 
statistically significant coefficients in both markets. From these countries Turkey, Indonesia 
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and Denmark remains with the same status from period 1 to period 2. South Korea and Hong 
Kong changed from price discovery place of bond market to undetermined and Poland from 
CDS market to undetermined. According to the regression results liquidity variable has a 
significant impact on the basis in five of the countries with undetermined price discovery 
place.  
 
This leaves me with 10 countries out of 21 to have price discovery in the bond market. 
Difference between the periods with bond market as primary price discovery place, is the 
significance of the coefficients. In the second period, even though price discovery takes place 
in the bond market, CDS market also is significant.   
 
In second period cluster 2 includes high basis countries which have bond or undetermined 
market as price discovery place. All of these countries have also positive and sig. liquidity 
factor in reg.  
 
Based on the empirical findings.  
Hypothesis Result 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Price discovery takes place in the 
bond market before the financial crisis. Accepted 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Price discovery takes place in the 
CDS market during the financial crisis. Rejected 
 
 
As final note, market might not have the same participants as the nature of the product is 
different and it is traded for different reason. This also gives the assumption that the market 
does not share the same information which the non-zero basis might indicate. This could be 
also the reason for the short-term pricing differences.  
8. Conclusion 
 
Collapse of Lehman Brothers created a domino effect, where financial institutions have had to 
turn to their governments for help. Too big to fail has been the mantra of the day. 
Governments have issued financial rescue packages with the cost of the public economy. 
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Earlier safe-haven statuses have been questioned by investors and not without a reason. 
Greece, Portugal and lately Spain have had to turn to International Monetary Fund and 
European Union for help to overcome the economic problems. As sovereign CDS contracts 
are mainly triggered by restructuring or late payments the protections bought might come in 
use nowadays.  
 
Studies on sovereign CDS market has grown substantially after the crisis began. Most of the 
studies have concentrated on specific market – emerging or developed, while trying to resolve 
the driving force of the CDS changes. All of the studies have also studied the basis, so called 
arbitrage opportunity measure, but have focused then more on the CDS premia itself. In this 
study I concentrated on studying the fundamentals of the basis and determinants of the basis 
changes geographically and time wise. This was done to see what changes and where they 
happened after the crisis began and could the reason for it be founded as well. To conclude 
the study I also tried to look for evidence of the price discovery place in each country. 
 
The basis measure showed a potential opportunity for arbitrage through constant positive 
basis although seldom used. What causes the constant positive basis was undetermined 
though. Adler and Song (2010) argued it to be due to short selling costs. Principal component 
analysis showed basis changes to be mainly due to one or two factors, which was partly 
supported by regression results. By looking at the regression results before crisis, risk appetite 
seemed to be the factor driving the basis changes and when entering time of distress 
economical and political instability and liquidity of markets seemed to have the biggest 
impact on the basis changes. Also Europe’s distress in second period could be seen though 
European Stock Market variable which becomes significant for most of the countries. 
Findings of liquidity and global variables to have an impact on basis is in line with previous 
studies.  
 
As the last part I studied the price discovery location. Before the crisis lead-lag relationship 
was clearer by stating bond market to be the market where price discovery takes place. This is 
also in line with Fontana and Scheicher’s (2010) argument of price discovery taking place in 
the market with the highest liquidity. Before the crises volumes of CDS trading on developed 
market countries was low which could explain the finding. After the Lehman Brothers 
collapsed, the price discovery becomes country depended and weakly could be tied to the 
liquidity situation of the markets. 
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When examining the basis geographically wise, cluster analysis show basis to follow 
theoretical models. In the model CDS premias are argued to be influenced mostly by debt and 
the volatility of it which can be seen through the basis levels. This resulted in clusters based 
on basis levels and economical uncertainty. Even though it follows theoretical framework it 
contradicts earlier findings of regional clustering (Longstaff et al., 2008). 
 
Even though the subject is studied widely after the crisis, there is still lot of questions 
unanswered. Further studies are still needed to examine for example the reasons for widely 
documented constant positive basis and what are the driving forces for price discovery 
locations. However the difficulty of the research arises from for example the OTC nature of 
the product and illiquidity of sovereign bond market which limits also the possibility of 
obtaining reliable data.  
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Appendix 
Figure 8. Basis spread changes. Figure represents average basis spread changes in all of the countries from 2nd of May 2008 to 30th of September 2010.
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Table 17. Correlation Matrix of Sovereign Basis Spreads. This table reports the pair-wise correlation coefficients for monthly excess sovereign credit returns for the indicated countries. Each 
pair-wise correlation is computed using all available overlapping observations for the two sovereigns. 
 
Period 1  May 2005 - September 2008 
Country Austria Australia Belgium Czech Republic Denmark Germany Greece 
Hong 
Kong Hungary Indonesia Ireland Italy Japan Norway Pakistan Poland Portugal Sweden 
South 
Africa 
South 
Korea Turkey 
Austria 1,000                     
Australia 0,378 1,000                    
Belgium 0,895 0,384 1,000                   
Czech Republic 0,910 0,421 0,962 1,000                  
Denmark 
-0,067 0,037 -0,079 -0,097 1,000                 
Germany 0,843 0,364 0,832 0,816 -0,045 1,000                
Greece 0,898 0,391 0,965 0,948 -0,041 0,806 1,000               
Hong Kong 0,800 0,505 0,808 0,837 -0,086 0,580 0,820 1,000              
Hungary 0,891 0,389 0,940 0,966 -0,107 0,757 0,939 0,864 1,000             
Indonesia 0,541 0,415 0,503 0,472 0,131 0,483 0,620 0,521 0,475 1,000            
Ireland 0,682 0,307 0,703 0,694 -0,095 0,594 0,678 0,606 0,648 0,439 1,000           
Italy 0,908 0,342 0,970 0,951 -0,084 0,815 0,988 0,793 0,935 0,585 0,680 1,000          
Japan 0,632 0,330 0,585 0,621 -0,056 0,524 0,540 0,477 0,573 0,157 0,445 0,540 1,000         
Norway 0,053 0,150 -0,004 0,018 0,094 0,060 -0,127 -0,031 -0,011 -0,271 0,048 -0,116 0,310 1,000        
Pakistan 0,859 0,242 0,832 0,849 -0,151 0,678 0,805 0,783 0,841 0,488 0,622 0,837 0,500 0,133 1,000       
Poland 0,883 0,315 0,933 0,959 -0,083 0,821 0,955 0,766 0,952 0,535 0,641 0,960 0,535 -0,094 0,813 1,000      
Portugal 0,922 0,367 0,982 0,966 -0,077 0,812 0,985 0,833 0,957 0,548 0,692 0,990 0,566 -0,044 0,863 0,955 1,000     
Sweden 
-0,188 0,066 -0,234 -0,240 0,194 -0,164 -0,271 -0,199 -0,266 -0,052 -0,047 -0,282 0,045 0,513 -0,070 -0,295 -0,247 1,000    
South Africa 0,895 0,336 0,952 0,949 -0,118 0,759 0,965 0,837 0,959 0,579 0,683 0,969 0,561 -0,101 0,861 0,943 0,970 -0,268 1,000   
South Korea 0,915 0,343 0,921 0,925 -0,099 0,755 0,940 0,848 0,917 0,637 0,696 0,946 0,534 -0,075 0,911 0,918 0,951 -0,214 0,955 1,000  
Turkey 0,543 0,311 0,509 0,529 -0,190 0,449 0,590 0,589 0,539 0,733 0,408 0,591 0,277 -0,288 0,545 0,562 0,546 -0,188 0,659 0,670 1,000 
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Table 18. Correlation Matrix of Sovereign Basis Spreads. This table reports the pair-wise correlation coefficients for monthly excess sovereign credit returns for the indicated countries. Each 
pair-wise correlation is computed using all available overlapping observations for the two sovereigns. 
 
Period 2  September 2008 - September 2010 
Country Austria Australia Belgium Czech Republic Denmark Germany Greece 
Hong 
Kong Hungary Indonesia Ireland Italy Japan Norway Pakistan Poland Portugal Sweden 
South 
Africa 
South 
Korea Turkey 
Austria 1,000                     
Australia 0,910 1,000                    
Belgium 0,605 0,521 1,000                   
Czech Republic 0,882 0,908 0,520 1,000                  
Denmark 0,871 0,917 0,465 0,895 1,000                 
Germany 0,875 0,809 0,812 0,794 0,745 1,000                
Greece 
-0,037 -0,140 0,720 -0,165 -0,173 0,304 1,000               
Hong Kong 0,803 0,923 0,303 0,866 0,865 0,619 -0,366 1,000              
Hungary 0,836 0,869 0,580 0,882 0,823 0,726 -0,024 0,856 1,000             
Indonesia 0,547 0,723 0,134 0,778 0,781 0,389 -0,410 0,838 0,778 1,000            
Ireland 0,633 0,467 0,873 0,459 0,401 0,711 0,581 0,286 0,550 0,027 1,000           
Italy 0,537 0,476 0,934 0,448 0,475 0,756 0,739 0,244 0,512 0,141 0,795 1,000          
Japan 0,435 0,293 0,638 0,251 0,147 0,615 0,549 0,086 0,235 -0,161 0,527 0,600 1,000         
Norway 0,952 0,943 0,578 0,907 0,873 0,846 -0,088 0,868 0,889 0,631 0,588 0,491 0,329 1,000        
Pakistan 0,522 0,664 -0,033 0,712 0,737 0,286 -0,594 0,787 0,631 0,841 -0,015 -0,049 -0,361 0,615 1,000       
Poland 0,917 0,940 0,522 0,979 0,928 0,798 -0,162 0,896 0,917 0,777 0,490 0,468 0,253 0,937 0,721 1,000      
Portugal 0,015 -0,077 0,744 -0,087 -0,112 0,379 0,961 -0,299 0,020 -0,338 0,629 0,783 0,557 -0,034 -0,531 -0,092 1,000     
Sweden 0,891 0,877 0,346 0,863 0,961 0,677 -0,298 0,844 0,776 0,722 0,350 0,347 0,144 0,860 0,733 0,906 -0,253 1,000    
South Africa 0,671 0,814 0,278 0,881 0,854 0,535 -0,332 0,877 0,849 0,974 0,174 0,261 -0,051 0,742 0,837 0,874 -0,253 0,791 1,000   
South Korea 0,670 0,815 0,266 0,858 0,829 0,526 -0,334 0,897 0,859 0,970 0,175 0,245 -0,027 0,749 0,838 0,857 -0,256 0,770 0,979 1,000  
Turkey 0,545 0,709 0,135 0,796 0,746 0,395 -0,417 0,828 0,779 0,984 0,031 0,119 -0,165 0,630 0,841 0,778 -0,338 0,688 0,975 0,971 1,000 
 
